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ABSTRACT
Friedrich Schiller’s Letters On The Aesthetic Education o f Man identifies specific
social conditions that prevent the development of individuals as complete beings. In order
for humans to live as complete beings they must learn to synthesize the opposing forces
of Nature and Reason, through the play-drive. Such a synthesis, he says, is the necessary
condition of humans developing themselves freely. The alternative is to be one-sidedly
determined by the demands of either the sense-drive or the form-drive.
Herbert Marcuse uses Schiller’s theory of aesthetics and combines it with the
social and political concepts allowing us to gain a more grounded understanding of the
social and environmental conditions brought about by capitalism, as well as the situation
of humanity within that system.
Both authors encourage us to think of humans as intrinsically valuable beings
who, given the necessary material, can transform themselves and their world according to
the laws of Freedom and Beauty.
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INTRODUCTION

According to Immanuel Kant, individuals possess both intrinsic and instrumental
value. It is immoral, Kant says, to treat people merely as instruments (as means to an end)
we must also acknowledge the intrinsic value of human beings. As instruments,
individuals contribute greatly to the development of human civilization. However,
people’s ability to act rationally gives rise to the issue of human dignity. This cannot be
done at the level of instrumentality alone, since instruments are objects that can be
replaced, whereas an autonomous, rational subject is irreplaceable. Human beings are
able to value human life beyond the level of instrumentality.
As such, when attempting to consider the situation of human beings, we must
begin by assuming that they possess both instrumental and intrinsic value. Furthermore,
we must also assume that, given the necessary resources, individuals are autonomous and
rational beings, capable of determining the course of their existence freely and creatively.
This will allow us to be in a position where we may recognize which resources are
necessary for the development of a better quality of life for human beings.
This ideal, autonomous human life may consist of the development and
maintenance o f life in general. This includes work, and the delay of gratification to some
extent, but it also includes ‘play’: the free development of human imagination. To be
sure, in order for individuals to develop their creative and imaginative faculties, they must
possess access to the proper resources: the basic needs of nutrition, water, shelter,
medicine, education, and personal freedom. Once those needs are satisfied, individuals
may then develop their abilities to manipulate form and matter imaginatively.

7
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This may be done through artistic activity in particular, for the pure and simple
enjoyment of one’s time. But this creative and imaginative interaction with the world may
also extend to the rest of society, and as such the social and political world itself becomes
subject to the laws of human imagination, and play. Individuals are able to express the
truth of Humanity: rational and autonomous beings that can creatively and imaginatively
shape their world according to rational laws they create.
However, as both past and current conditions show us, the world on the whole has
adopted a poorly conceived notion of the individual as being first and foremost an
instrument of labor. This particular conception of the individual neglects the intrinsic
value of human capabilities, and complete human development since it only considers
them as tools. The system o f Western capitalism in particular demands the highest
amount of productivity and contribution from citizens. The goal of Western capitalism is
primarily, the increase of profit and capital. The quality of human life comes second, and
only to those who are able to pay for it.
Though the quality o f human life has improved drastically, thanks to the technological
advancements made possible by the current system of production, there still remains a
clause: a better human life is available only to those who can afford it. And since the
unequal distribution of wealth and resources has rendered most of the world’s population
poor, most people are unable to partake in the improved quality of life that is offered by
the capitalist market. Most individuals must work in order in order to acquire the most
basic resources that are necessary for human life: food, water and shelter. Education and
freedom come at a price that not many are able to afford. And furthermore, the freedom
that individuals experience is limited by parameters that are established the ruling social

8
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order. Thus, individual freedom amounts to the act of consuming mass produced
commodities: an individual is free to choose from any of the comforts that are offered by
the system of production, as long as he or she is able to pay for them. But this is a poor
conception of human freedom because:
1- It is limited by the pre-established parameters of the existing social order
2- Individuals must spend their time working, sometimes dehumanizing jobs in order
to afford the basic needs for life.
Most people are trapped in a cycle of labor and the consumption of mass-produced
commodities, with little to no room for the free and autonomous development of human
imagination, and the human character in general. The result is the needless suffering of
many human beings at the hands of poverty, famine, and illiteracy.
And though we now possess the necessary material and intellectual and
technological resources to lift ourselves from these degrading conditions, those resources
are still only used for the perpetuation of the norms and values that perpetuate those
conditions.
This is the result of a specific form of rationality which seeks to reduce any
concepts such as freedom, pleasure, and the individual to the level of functional variables
that are computed into the overall development of the existing capitalist order.
When a society does not recognize, and by that I mean: when a society does not provide
equal access to basic resources for all its citizens it results in a failure to recognize the
intrinsic value of humanity. Thus the intrinsic value of the individual, as a rational,
autonomous being is neglected, and we are left with an inhuman and immoral conception
of individuals as instruments only.

9
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In this project I propose that the conception of human beings as rational, autonomous and
creative beings is an ideal that we must continuously develop and revise. Each individual,
given the necessary resources, has a task of becoming fully human, that is: to develop his
or her beliefs and capabilities free. The problems arise when norms and values are
imposed on people by an alien system that holds little to no value for human dignity. I
will use Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education o f Man to begin my
dissertation in order to expose the misunderstanding which surrounds the human
character.

Next, I will refer to Herbert Marcuse’s work, primarily in Eros and

Civilization, One-Dimensional Man, and An Essay on Liberation to ground Schiller’s
ideals with the necessary social and political concepts. The goal is for human beings to
ascend to the position where they are able to determine their own existence freely.

10
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CHAPTER 1:
FRIEDRICH SCHILLER AND THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF SOCIETY

Friedrich Schiller provides us with a philosophical assessment of the social
problems that seem to constrict human development: Specifically, he explains why the
social conditions that human beings have created for themselves do not accommodate the
full potential of humanity. Human beings are imaginative, creative, and rational beings,
and require an established structure that enables them to realize this potential. This
philosophical assessment will provide the thesis with the conceptual foundations
necessary for the critique of contemporary social reality. Given the historical context in
which he wrote, however, Schiller can provide no more than the conceptual framework.
The actual critique of society must employ the more complex social philosophy of
Herbert Marcuse.
Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education o f Man aim at improving
the human condition, which, he tells us, is impoverished by the schism between Nature
and Reason. Though Schiller’s conception of Nature and Reason is similar to Immanuel
Kant’s, I will limit my exploration of Kant’s conception of Nature and Reason. It will be
sufficient to say that, for Kant, Nature refers to the physical world and physical desires
which are constantly changing: While Reason refers to our rational faculties and moral
laws which are absolute and binding on all rational beings. Since the focus of this chapter
centers on Schiller I will only say that for Kant
When we judge something as aesthetic, we do not judge it to be
one of a class, as we would in determinant judgment. We do not
place it in the empirical world. Instead, we place it with respect to
ourselves. In doing so, we apprehend the object not as belonging

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to a particular order or class of objects, but as belonging to, or
fitting in with, our own faculties. The object thus seems to have as
its own inner structure or order, a conformity to our own faculties;
this is the order we are interested in.1
Kant’s conception of aesthetics involves many categories of relationships between the
subject and the object. Amongst the most important are: 1- our subjective relationship to
the object, 2- the relationship between human imagination and aesthetic judgment, 3-the
relationship between aesthetic judgments and universal validity.

Furthermore, we

classify the characteristics of a given object according to certain aesthetic criteria that we
define, and then make an aesthetic judgment about the object.

■j

Schiller believes that aesthetics serves an important moral purpose: to improve all
human beings. Beauty, he believes, involves free and imaginative creation, which is why
the activity of play goes hand in hand with it. The relationship between play and beauty
works out as follows: Play involves free and imaginative creation through the synthesis of
form and matter. We engage in free and imaginative creation when we combine form and
matter by using our imagination. Furthermore, he says, when we play we transform
ourselves into living shape, we become our own imaginative creations and that is why he
says human beings are beautiful when they play.4 Therefore, for Schiller, beauty arises
from the activity o f the play-drive, i.e., the imaginative activity of synthesizing form and

1 Sychrava, Juliet. Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press,
1989. p.20
2 Stirk, Peter M.R. “Eros and Civilization revisited” History o f The Human Sciences. 1999 SAGE
Publications (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 12 N o.l p.73-90.
3 Sychrava, Juliet. Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press,
1989. p.20
I should not that Schiller owes much to Kant’s theory o f aesthetics and human freedom.
4 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967. p .101
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matter. Also, we see that both play and beauty involve free and imaginative activity. I
will now go on to explain how Schiller develops his ideas of Play and Beauty.
Schiller identifies two drives, within every human being, which place different
demands on the individual. The first is the sense-drive which contains all of our animal or
natural impulses, including sense perceptions, emotions, eating, aggression and sex5
The first of these, which I will call the sensuous drive, proceeds
from the physical existence of man, or his sensuous nature. Its
business is to set him within the limits of time, and to turn him
into matter—not to provide him with matter, since that, of course,
would presuppose a free activity of the Person capable of
receiving such matter, and distinguishing it from the Self as from
that which persists. By matter in this context we understand
nothing more than change, or reality which occupies Time.
Consequently this drive demands that there shall be change, that
time shall have a content. This state, which is nothing but time
occupied by content, is called sensation, and it is through this
alone that physical existence makes itself known.6
Since the sense-drive requires stimulation from the outside, the purely sensual individual
cannot determine the course of his or her life. This is because the sense-drive subject to
the forces o f time and change, both of which are beyond human control.

n

Furthermore,

the sense-drive is passive in that it requires outside stimulation to be brought into action.
For example, the scent of flowers arouses our sense of smell, and our sense of taste is
aroused when we place lemon juice on the tongue. Therefore, Schiller continues
“although it is this drive alone which awakens and develops the potentialities of man, it is

5 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich W eisstein Ed. Tw ayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:

Twayne Publishers, 1981. p.20
6 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967. p.79
7 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981. p.20-21
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also this drive alone which makes their complete fulfilment impossible.”8 The sensuous
individual only possesses potentiality and not actuality since he is still a receiver and not
yet a creator.
The second force is the formal-drive which expresses the individual’s rational
faculty. The form-drive discovers scientific laws, and creates moral laws, as well as
abstract concepts such as freedom, truth, and justice.9 For example, through the formdrive we discover laws of physics and chemistry, and also create the social laws that
protect individuals. Humans are rational beings who are capable of understanding laws
that govern Nature, and also of creating moral and political laws that protect and govern
their social lives. The form-drive, he says “proceeds from the absolute existence of man,
or from his rational nature, and is intent on giving him the freedom to bring harmony into
the diversity of his manifestations, and to affirm his Person among all his changes of
Condition.”10

The rational faculty then applies these conceptions to our feelings and

experiences, creating a coherent set of meanings for us. It is not influenced by Time and
therefore its laws are universal and permanent. He continues, “In so doing, it preserves
our identity through the changing conditions of the world around us.”11 The form-drive,
unlike the sense-drive, seeks permanence instead of change.12 Finally, the form-drive is
an active faculty that helps us to discover and create laws; it seeks to determine rather
than to be determined from without.
8 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) N ew York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.81

9 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981. p.21
10 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967. p.81
11 Ibid, p.21
12 Ibid.
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The play-drive is the synthesis of the sensuous and formal drives. It alone allows
us to develop our entire human character. Schiller views humans as multi-dimensional
beings with multiple talents and abilities. This means that individuals may develop artistic
talents, athletic and physical talents together, instead of simply one.13 The play-drive
involves creative, imaginative activity that is done for its own sake. For example, we may
dance or draw for the simple enjoyment of the activity and not to satisfy a strictly
utilitarian goal. Thus, the individual is determined by two drives: the sensual and the
rational, and the aim of every individual, according to Schiller, is to synthesize both
drives through play. In other words, lull human activity requires the synthesis of both
sensuous and formal drives through play.
However, society is not organized in such a way so as to benefit the individual’s
growth of self, i.e. play. Individuals are guided by one-sided activity determined by either
the sense-drive or the form-drive.

Schiller attributes this problem to society to the

emphasis on specialized, specified use of the individual as a tool: “...once the
increasingly complex machinery of State necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks
and occupations, then the inner unity of human nature was severed too.”14 Thus, he
concludes, society must fix the issue of undeveloped human potential so that individuals
may explore a humanity that is beyond the status of specialized tools.15
Schiller tells us that it is a common belief that the fate of humanity is determined
within the political sphere. Ideally, elected officials discuss such issues as human rights,
13 Ibid, p.97
14 Ibid, p.33
15 Throughout the Sixth Letter, Schiller maintains that the view o f the individual as a whole becomes
fragmented, when society’s emphasis on the individual is one-sided. He tells that that though specialization
in one area or another may have certain benefits, they do not amount to the harm brought upon the person’s
humanity “only the equal tempering o f them all (physical and mental abilities), (produce) happy and
complete human beings.” Ibid, p.43
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justice, liberty, and attempt to create meaningful laws that will benefit the citizens of a
society:
Is it not, to say the least, untimely to be casting around for a code
of laws for the aesthetic world at a moment when the affairs of the
moral offer interest of so much more urgent concern, and when
the spirit o f philosophical inquiry is being expressly challenged by
present circumstances to concern itself with that most perfect of
all the works to be achieved by the art of man: the construction of
true political freedom?16
Here, Schiller claims that the realm of politics is itself problematic and its issues can only
be solved at the level of the aesthetic.

11

Furthermore, Schiller tells us, the aim of

philosophical inquiry is to allow human beings to achieve “true Political and Moral
Freedom.”

18

Schiller explains in the Second Letter, the artistic consciousness of human

beings has become dependent on material needs and not human ideals. Excessive focus
on utility and materialism, he believes, undermines the sort of self-improvement that is
necessary for the realization of our potential.

Furthermore, individuals have become

overspecialized tools who neglect their human development and focus on their
development as instruments. However, Schiller is optimistic that the problem may be
solved, since he claims that the road to human freedom is paved by the aesthetic. Thus,
Schiller’s work seems to focus particularly on the political and moral development of
society in order to reconstruct a more complete concept of human freedom through
aesthetics.
In the first section of the letters, Schiller considers both individual human beings

16 Ibid, p.7
17 Regin, Deric. Freedom and Dignity: The Historical and Philosophical Thought o f Schiller. Martinus
NijhoffEd., The Hague, Netherlands. 1965. p .120
18 Sychrava, Juliet. Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press,
1989. p.23
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and human civilization as entities that progress over definite stages. Both individuals and
civilization begin in the Natural State, where their actions are determined by natural laws
and physical inclinations. In the Third Letter, Schiller refers to the earlier history of
human beings as a starting point. In their earliest stages of development, human beings
were wholly dependent on nature: “she (Nature) acts for him as long as he is as yet
incapable of acting himself as a free intelligence.”19 However, Schiller continues, human
beings have the ability to rise above their dependence on Nature. In the age of reason,
human beings awoke from their sensuous slumber to find themselves in “The State”.20
The Natural State represents human beings in the earliest stage of development,
before they have had a chance to develop their rational faculties. As such, social cohesion
is not freely chosen, but rather, it is arranged according to the laws of nature and built to
satisfy the material requirements of individuals. At this stage, human beings are still
creatures who are largely determined by Nature; driven by appetites and physical needs.
For example, humans are driven by their physical need to survive: they protect
themselves from harm, but they may also fight over food and shelter. The challenge,
Schiller says, is one “o f transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free
choice, and of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity.”

91

But the problem lies

precisely in how to move from physical to moral necessity.22 Schiller will go on to argue

19 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p .l 1
20 Miller, R.D. Schiller and the Ideal o f Freedom: A Study o f Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters
on Kant. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 107
21 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967. p. 17
22 Specifically, it is not possible to ‘leap’ from the physical to the moral state since both impose different
demands on the individual; and any attempt to make such a ‘leap’ requires that we break our bond with the
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that we need a mediation between the physical and the moral in order to satisfy the
demands of both. In such a case, where the relationship between the physical and the
moral is mediated, individuals may be free to live according to rational laws without
being determined by natural laws.23
Schiller tells us that human beings cannot exist at the natural stage of development
for an extended period of time, since there is the moral and rational demand for the
protection and the preservation of life, and the pursuit of happiness. The drive for
preserving life extends beyond the physical and pushes human beings to organize the first
formation of government24 Schiller explains that human beings are able to break from
the bonds of Nature once the faculty of Reason awakens. Unlike the Natural State, where
individuals are ruled by their appetites, laws and principles govern human beings in the
Rational State. Then, compulsion is transformed into free self-determination. He says:
Every individual human being, one may say, carries within
him, potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of
a human being, and it is his life’s task to be, through all his
changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of
this ideal.25
According to Schiller, each individual possesses the potential of transforming the self,
according to social laws, through free-choice into an ideal human being.

Of t

Now if every

autonomous, rational individual is able to work towards and ideal form of humanity it is

physical, which is impossible. As a result, attempting to leap from the physical to the moral by virtue o f
neglecting the demands o f the physical results in misunderstanding o f the point o f the challenge: to seek
and maintain balance between both.
23 Though in a sense, human beings are always determined by natural laws insofar as their physical
existence.

24 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981. p. 17
25 Ibid, p. 17
26 Individuals would be free to develop themselves without infringing on laws that serve to protect other
people and their interests.
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the task o f every human being to approximate that ideal: a harmonious union between
reason and feeling, through the play-drive, allows us to achieve this ideal.27
The challenge becomes more difficult when the rational faculties have developed,
and both the Natural and the Rational States begin to make equal demands on the
individual. Schiller wants to reconcile the constraints made by each realm without
sacrificing the demands o f one to the other. This reconciliation means that every person
who strives to achieve the ideal of the “complete human being” does so by synthesizing
both the Natural and Rational sides of human nature.28 According to Schiller the sensedrive and the form-drive are synthesized through play. As we shall see, it is through play,
for Schiller, that we combine the ideas of our mind with matter from the physical world,
thus resolving the tension between Nature and Reason, since they now work together.
The next step, he explains, is to attempt to establish a Moral State with the help of
the rational faculties. However, the transition to the Moral State is not an easy task.
Indeed, Schiller acknowledges that it is pointless to seek any type of political reform as
long as individuals do not first become “whole”.29 According to Schiller, it is not
possible to simply leap from the Natural to the Moral State. The moral State is ruled by
reason and the intellect, its laws are different from Natural ones insofar as rational and

27 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967. p .17
28 Ibid. p.92-93 For Schiller, both drives must be tempered, which means that we must properly understand
the boundaries o f each one so that w e may understand how they can work together. He says: “In a single
word: Personality must keep the sensuous drive within its proper bounds, and receptivity, or Nature, must
do the same with the formal drive.”
29 Ibid, p.45 In the Seventh Letter Schiller says : “we must continue to regard every attempt at political
reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as chimerical, as long as the split within man is not
healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer o f the State, and
guarantee the reality o f this political creation o f Reason,”
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moral laws are conceived and understood by humans.30 He says: “Nature in her physical
creation points the way we have to take in the moral. Not until the strife of elemental
forces in the lower organisms has been assuaged does she turn to the nobler creation of
physical man.”

Nature, he tells us, provides us with the material we need for the moral,

it is the grounds upon which the moral is built. We must not forget that Nature is the basis
for any form of moral or rational human activity, and as such we are physically and
rationally dependent on Nature, Schiller says:
What we must chiefly bear in mind, then, is that physical society
in time must never for a moment cease to exist while moral
society as idea is in the process of being formed; that for the sake
of man’s moral dignity his actual existence must never be
jeopardized.32
What Schiller means is that the existence of the moral laws and values of a society
depend on the physical existence of its citizens. It seems more rational to ensure the
physical well being of the citizens in order to ensure social growth and development. On
the surface, for example, the physical existence of human beings contributes to
constructing the very buildings where discussion about laws and morals take place. And
on a deeper level, we may imagine, a given society might not get very far if most of its
citizens are dying from malnutrition and disease. Our physical existence must be
preserved if we hope to even conceive of a Moral State. Therefore, while it is necessary
that human beings move towards organizing the State according to laws, it is very
important not to disregard the Natural State in the process.

30 Human beings are able to understand the physical laws o f the universe through the sciences. Likewise
human beings create moral laws that govern societies.
31 Ibid, p.45
32 Ibid, p. 13
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Additionally, Schiller tells us, there seems to be a conflict between the Natural
State and the Rational State, which follows from the one-sided attitude of Reason. It is
important to critically examine the conflict between Reason and Nature if we are to
understand how to resolve it. The failure to resolve the conflict is due to human error,
Schiller believes, and not because of any ‘irreconcilability’ between the rational and
natural laws. He explains the nature of the conflict in the following passage
Reason does indeed demand unity; but Nature demands
multiplicity; and both these kinds of law make their claim upon
man. The law o f Reason is imprinted upon him by an
incorruptible consciousness; the law of Nature by an ineradicable
feeling. Hence it will always argue a still defective education if
the moral character is able to assert itself only by sacrificing the
natural.33
This basically tells us that the individual cannot understand the demand of true Reason (to
be synthesized with Nature). In this way each realm is understood separately: 1- The
Natural realm is organized according to natural forces that are based on desire, 2inclination and the Rational realm is organized according to rational laws that are based
on universality. The individual neglects the demands of either drive when he or she is
forced to focus on satisfying the demands of one drive in particular. This is important
because, Schiller warns, it is not possible to improve the political situation of a State,
without first improving each citizen of that State. Therefore, while it is important for us to
acknowledge the conflict between nature and reason, we may also be positive about
resolving it because, according to Schiller, humans are creatures who are able to improve
and enhance their lives through imaginative and creative activity.
Due to the conflict between Reason and Nature, human beings misunderstand
their duty to themselves, which is to develop as creatures that represent the union of the
33 Ibid, p. 19
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physical and the formal realms. Instead, he continues, individuals reside in either the
physical world where they are driven by material causes or in the formal realm where
they are ruled by reason. As a result of being ruled by exclusively one drive or the other
the individual develops only one side of their nature, and never the complete being (union
of nature and reason). The problem with cultivating only one side of our human nature,
Schiller says, is that we completely miss out on the benefits that arise from the uniting
both.34 An incomplete human being “cannot cope with the highly advanced moral
principles that demand— among other things— discipline, will power, respect for human
dignity, and detachment from material things.”35 Schiller’s notices the need for social
change, but more importantly this passage seems to tell us that we must change ourselves
before we can begin to understand “highly advanced moral principles”. In other words, it
would be a mistake to believe that we have understood anything before we have begun to
fully understand ourselves.36 This is an important goal for all of humanity: we must
attempt to understand the nature of the conflict between Nature and Reason if we are to
resolve it, and more towards a higher moral State.
Furthermore, since an incomplete individual is not capable of grasping the
concept o f the ideal society, any efforts aimed at improving society through the political
sphere will ultimately fail. For example, Schiller draws our attention to the aftermath that
of the French Revolution, when individuals insisted dogmatically upon principles and
reason in order to justify the torture and killing of other human beings. This dogmatic

34 Ibid, p.43
35 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981. p .17
36 The understanding o f ourselves as autonomous and creative beings who possess the ability to synthesize
the demands o f the natural and the rational.
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obsession with reason—the unquestioned commitment to a realm whose demands have
not yet been fully understood—Schiller explains, neglects the basic value of life. The
development of the Natural State is compromised in favor of the Rational State. I will
now discuss the consequences that individuals must bear as a result of the unresolved
conflict between Nature and Reason.

THE SAVAGES AND THE BARBARIANS:

This social schism between the physical and rational sides of human nature causes
individuals to be at odds with themselves in two ways: Either as savage, when feeling
.

.

•

•

•

.

TT

predominates over principle; or as barbarian, when principle destroys feeling.”

The

conditions of the savage and the barbarian need to be discussed further in order to
-lo

understand the impact of the tension.

I will discuss Schiller’s concept of the “savage”,

the “barbarian”, and then move on to explain their connection to Nature and Reason.
The savages are individuals who are ruled by the sense-drive, and as such also
ruled by physical desires and appetites. Furthermore, their intolerance and inability to
grasp laws, Schiller says, threaten the existence of society.39 Schiller says: “The savage
despises Civilization, and acknowledges Nature as his sovereign mistress.”40

For

example, the savage is too sick, hungry and poor to be concerned with political matters.

37 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. W ilkinson. E.M. &

Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.21
381 will not go into any detail about the savage and the barbarian since my interest is in Schiller’s theory o f
aesthetics. Though a brief mention o f both will help illustrate Schiller’s points about the extremes o f
behaving according to either sense-drive or form-drive alone.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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After the French Revolution, the savages suffered torture, misery and death, at the hands
of those representing the principles of ‘enlightenment’ (justice, democracy etc.). These
principles of enlightenment were used to justify the suppression and execution of the
savages.41 Therefore, the ‘enlightened’ Civilization neglects the needs of the savage, who
is viewed as lawless, selfish and incapable of understanding reason (as the barbarians
understand it) in favor of developing a notion of reason that is used to suppress nature.
On the other hand, the barbarian is consumed by Reason to the point where he
forgets about Nature. As Schiller says “the barbarian derides and dishonours Nature, but,
more contemptible than the savage, as often as not continues to be the slave of his
slave.”42 The barbarian’s understanding of reason is impoverished in the sense that it
does not empower the human character anymore than it sets it free. Reason simply
confirms the enlightened in their corrupt state.43 As such, the principles of the
enlightenment, following the French Revolution, aim to further develop a poorly
conceived notion of reason that is used to confirm the existing order rather than liberating
human beings.44 Due to this underdeveloped conception of Reason, the barbarians do not
seek to achieve the wholeness of being that Schiller envisions. Instead they simply seek to
41 Being ‘rid’ o f the savages was simply easier than dedicating any time and effort to understanding their
social conditions.
42 Ibid.
43 The condition o f the savage, Miller says “which threaten the structure o f civil order, form one aspect o f
the problem; on the other hand the enlightenment o f which the refined classes boast, instead o f having an
ennobling influence on their minds, tends rather to confirm them in their corrupt state.” (Miller, p. 109)
Miller, R.D. Schiller and the Ideal o f Freedom: A Study o f Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters on
Kant. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. p.109
44 For Schiller, the true purpose o f reason, which is strive towards the unification o f nature and reason, is
undermined when our talents and skills are developed in order to serve a specific social purpose: the
advancement o f a specific form o f reason that neglects the complete nature o f the individual. As such, the
liberation o f human beings must include an understanding o f the connection between the demands o f nature
and reason; so that we may develop on the basis o f a harmonious relationship between both.
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distance themselves from their physical Nature, believing that attachment to the physical
realm only clouds rational judgment.45
So far Schiller has recounted the social schism in human civilization: one side of
humanity is consumed by Nature and appetite, whereas, the other side of humanity is
consumed by a kind o f pseudo-reason and “Thus, do we see the spirit of the age wavering
between perversity and brutality, between unnaturalness and mere nature, between
superstition and moral unbelief.”46 In order to rescue themselves from these conditions
individuals must learn to acknowledge the demands of both drives, while also respecting
the limits of both. The central point that we must retain from Schiller is that by not
focusing on synthesizing both drives we are in fact resisting a transcendental demand by
Reason. In a very important passage, Schiller says:
Reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand:
Let there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the
material drive; that is to say let there be a play-drive, since on the
union of reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity
with freedom, makes the concept of human nature complete.
Reason must make this demand, because it is reason—because it
is its nature to insist on perfection and on the abolition of all
limitation, and because any exclusive activity on the part of either
the one drive or the other leaves human nature incomplete and
gives rise to some limitation within it. 47
Schiller is telling us that reason seeks to overcome limitation, and insofar as ‘irrational
conditions’ (for example, needless death and suffering) are considered limitations to the
development of reason (a more complete and fulfilling life, for example) ‘Reason’ seeks
to overcome them. And since, as Schiller tells us, it is irrational to neglect the demands of

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid, p. 103
This is very important because it seems very similar to the concept o f dialectics in the way that Marcuse
describes it: reason overcoming what is irrational through reflective criticism.
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one realm over the other, Reason seeks to strike a balance between both. Therefore, it
seems, in order for the individual to function holistically an attempt must be made to
reach a synthesis between the demands of both the Natural and the Rational spheres.
Schiller

attributes

most

of the

illnesses

plaguing

human

beings

to

overspecialization, which leads individuals to develop only one side of their being,
knowing a great deal of information about one area and ignoring other areas . For
Schiller, true social progress requires the complete development of individuals as the
union of nature and reason. Societies fall short of the true ‘human state’ when human
potential is suppressed by factors such as overspecialization. The overspecialized
individual focuses on developing one specific area of the human character, thus inevitably
neglecting the other faculties.
It is important for us to understand the seriousness of Schiller’s claim that
civilization is at fault for its focus on fostering specialized individuals, thereby
encouraging the schism between Nature and Reason. He says:
It was civilization itself which inflicted this wound upon modem
man. Once the increase of empirical knowledge and more exact
modes of thought, made sharper divisions between the sciences
inevitable, and once the increasingly complex machinery of State
necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks and occupations,
then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and
disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance.49
The unity between Nature and Reason is severed when social emphasis tilted towards
Reason. Indeed, the “inner nature” of human beings is disturbed as social relations are
categorized further according to empirical knowledge, which instrumentalizes human

48 Ibid, p.33
49 Ibid.
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potentialities.50 Therefore, overspecialization is the result of social organization that
follows a specific pattern which neglects the need to synthesize the opposing forces of
both drives. And as such, the balance between both the realm of arts and that of sciences
is immediately disturbed.51
A more holistic, human development is exemplified by the Greek State. The
ancient Greeks were artists, philosophers, politicians and gymnasts, developing many of
the human talents distinctly as ends in themselves. Modem society, by contrast, demands
overspecialization, and this leads us to the disregard of overall development of human
character. Indeed insofar as it aims at harnessing human potential towards one specific
activity, it succeeds greatly.52 The overspecialized individual, he tells us, forsakes the
multiple dimensions of humanity in pursuit of one particular dimension with one
particular function.53
However, though the ancient Greek state flourished and encouraged the
development of the multiple talents of human beings, it eventually collapsed. For the
ancient Greeks the focus shifted from the view of the individual as a multi-dimensional

50 This is another one o f Schiller’s points we should keep in mind, since it seems as if he is hinting at the
dangers o f “operationalism” as Marcuse will discuss. For Marcuse, the concept o f the individual is
undermined, indeed the individual altogether, when it is reduced to a particular instance or social behavior.
The common thread between both authors is that the individual’s human dignity and potentiality are
undermined when the understanding o f the ‘individual’ is reduced to a specific social function (worker,
consumer, etc.)
51 Ibid, p.33
52 Regarding the Greeks, Schiller says: “With the Greeks, humanity undoubtedly reached a maximum o f
excellence, which could neither be maintained at that level nor rise any higher. Not maintained, because the
intellect was unavoidably compelled by the store o f knowledge it already possessed to dissociate itself from
feeling and intuition in an attempt to arrive at exact discursive understanding; not rise any higher, because
only a specific degree o f clarity is compatible with a specific fullness and warmth. This degree the Greeks
had attained; and had they wished to proceed to a higher stage o f development, they would, like us, have
had to surrender their wholeness o f being and pursue truth along separate paths.” Ibid, p.41
53 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p. 18-19
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being with multiple talents and abilities that must be holistically developed, to the view of
the individual as a rational creature above all else.54 Modem society faces the same
problem.55
The concept of specialization itself appears like a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, Schiller praises specialization since it allows us to make great advancements in
science and medicine. On the other hand, individuals become objects: “In a specialized
society, the individual becomes a tool subordinate to the whole, valued according to his
usefulness.”56 Doctors, lawyers and teachers are valuable insofar as they are useful and
productive members of their society, and not because they are human beings.
Furthermore, Schiller strongly doubts the value of the role of human beings as simple
productive, specialized members of society, he says
Forced to resort to classification in order to cope with the variety
of its citizens, and never to get an impression of humanity except
through representation at second hand, the governing section ends
up by losing sight of them altogether, confusing their concrete
reality with a mere construct of the intellect.58
This is how both the existence and the essence of the individual are undermined as a
result of being reduced to a particular function in society and “a mere construct of the
intellect.”
Although “specialization” is responsible for many great advances for any

54 Miller, R.D. Schiller and the Ideal o f Freedom: A Study o f Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters
on Kant. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 109
55 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.35
56 Ibid, p. 19
57 Schiller believes that human beings are creatures that are capable o f rationally understanding and
organizing their world in a multitude o f ways (social, economical etc.) creatively and imaginatively.
58 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.37
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civilization, it alone cannot fully realize the potentials and ideals of human beings.59 Our
attention should be focused on bringing both faculties of Nature and Reason into harmony
and based on the union of both realms humans may develop as free beings. Moreover,
since we are multi-dimensional beings, with many abilities and talents, our humanity is
undermined when our existence is reduced to our function as specialized workers. For
example, although we may have an abundance of doctors, lawyers, and teachers, there are
very few human beings, in Schiller’s normative sense of ‘human beings’. Therefore, in an
overspecialized society, human beings are not free to develop as complete beings, and
instead they interact with each other as specific tools with specific duties.60
However, the problem of the divided human being cannot be solved by the State.
For Schiller, only the individual can work on uniting reason and feeling, and in turn, give
birth to a State that encompasses full and complete human beings “improvement can only
originate from the mind of man, after he has overcome the split in his nature, separating
reason and feeling.”61 Those who are falsely enlightened are so because they allow
reason to rule over their inner nature. And the result of allowing one realm to rule over
the other leads to the inevitable neglect of the individual’s ‘other h alf, and the task of
becoming ‘whole’ is undermined. And insofar as we value our development as complete
individuals, as opposed to fragmented ones, Schiller says “It must, therefore, be wrong if

59 This issue surrounding “specialization” and “overspecialization” maybe similar, in some ways, to the
concepts o f “repression and surplus repression” that I will discuss in the next chapter. They are somewhat
similar because both involve a degree o f conformity for the purposes o f maintaining and developing human
civilization, and they both present a hindrance to the free and autonomous development o f individuals when
they become part o f the ruling principles o f the established order.
60 Ibid.
61 Regin, Deric. Freedom and Dignity: The Historical and Philosophical Thought o f Schiller. Martinus
NijhoffEd., The Hague, Netherlands. 1965, p.123
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62

the cultivation o f individual powers involves the sacrifice o f wholeness.”

In the seventh letter, Schiller argues that people must not only break free of the
confines of Nature, but they must also broaden their understanding of Reason, and at the
same time embracing Nature.63 This holistic Reason seeks to unite with Nature instead of
widening the gap between the two realms.
However, neither politics nor pseudo-reason can remedy the condition of the
bifurcated individual. Politics, Schiller says, cannot bridge the schism of the human
character, since the political realm has contributed to that split. For example, excessive
focus on politics tips the scale towards one side of the human character and neglects the
other realms.64 Reason, as well, cannot bridge the gap “...because although its task is to
conceive and to establish law, it has no power to enforce it.”65 Therefore, it is through the
higher arts that human beings will reach truth and freedom.66 I will now discuss what
Schiller means when he refers to the healing powers of the higher arts.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN NATURE AND REASON:

In the Ninth Letter Schiller proposes that the human character can only be
reconciled as a union of Nature and Reason through aesthetics. The activity that acts as a
bridge between Nature and Reason is free and imaginative creativity, or as he says “This
62 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson, E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) N ew York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.43
63 Miller, R.D. Schiller and the Ideal o f Freedom: A Study o f Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters
on Kant. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. p .l 10
64 Ibid, p.49
65 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p .19
66 Sychrava, Juliet. Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press,
1989, p.24
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instrument is Fine Art.”67 Art, Schiller tells us,

“good or bad, shapes man’s value

system. Values exist because we perceive them; and what we perceive, and how we
perceive them depends on the Arts. We prize authenticity, individuality, and freedom
because creative individuals have instructed us in their value.”68 Likewise, Schiller draws
attention to the reconciling powers of the Arts: creative activities through which both the
sense and the form drive are synthesized, which he says redeems human dignity.69 He
believes it is the duty o f the artist to pave the way towards a complete human character,
and to help elevate human beings above and beyond their animal nature.70 Thus,
according to Schiller’s theory of social evolution, human beings ascend from the natural
state to the moral state by means of a character that is developed through a rt71
But how exactly does art become the bridge that links Nature and Reason? First,
we must realize that Schiller differentiates between an aesthetic object (a painting or
sculpture) and the aesthetic state: a condition or state that humans may achieve through
aesthetic activity. It is through aesthetic activity that human beings can recognize
themselves as both sensuous and rational creatures. Individuals are able to achieve a more
complete moral understanding of ‘what it means to be human’ because the notion of
‘human being” is based on the union of the whole human character. Additionally,
individuals become open to the possibility of perceiving themselves as free human

67 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.55
68 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p .19
69 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson, E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.57
70 Ibid, p.61
71 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p.20

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

beings.72

Therefore, aesthetics allows us to understand that the true value of the

individual is more than instrumental.
Before I attempt to explain how Schiller believes people may regain and develop
their humanity through the aesthetic, I will need to discuss his conception of “Beauty”. In
the Tenth Letter he tells us that he is presupposing a concept of beauty that is derived
from something more than “Experience” alone “since by means of it we are to decide
whether that which in experience we call beautiful is justly entitled to the name”.73 This
concept o f beauty informs our judgements about our experiences, even though it is not
derived from experience and as such seems “to be discovered by a process of abstraction,
and deduced from the sheer potentialities of our sensuo-rational nature.”74 Therefore,
Schiller argues, beauty must be shown to be a necessary condition of Human Being,
instead of simply being conceived as an individual’s experience of something.
At this point, the question arises: how is it possible to resolve the oppositions
between the form drive and the sense drive? The first step, according to Schiller, is to
realize that the opposition between the drives do not negate the other. The tendencies of
both drives may conflict, but their objectives do not.75 On the one hand the sense-drive
seeks to change experience only, and not laws. On the other hand, the form drive seeks
permanence in laws, and not in experience. Both drives do not conflict in nature. Schiller
emphasizes that the strife between them is due to human error. The error arises precisely

72 Sychrava, Juliet. Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989, p.25
73 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.69
74 Ibid
75 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p.21
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when the individual neglects the demands o f one drive for the other, he says:

It is true that their tendencies do indeed conflict with eachother,
but— and this is the point to note—not in the same objectives, and
things which never make contact cannot collide. The sensuous
drive does indeed demand change; but it does not demand the
extension of this to the Person and its domain, does not demand a
change in principles. The formal drive insists on unity and
persistence—but it does not require the Condition to be stabilized
as well as the Person, does not require identity of sensation. The
two, are, therefore, not by nature opposed; and if they
nevertheless seem to be so, it is because they have become
opposed through a wonton transgression of Nature, through
mistaking their nature and function, and confusing their spheres of
1ft
operation.
This tells us that if the form-drive is neglected, human beings are not able to assert
freedom or produce laws. Likewise, without the sense-drive the form drive possesses no
material with which to work. Therefore, the two drives do not conflict in nature. Their
conflict is due to human error. Specifically, problems arise when human beings focus on
developing one drive over the other.
It should be clear now that, according to Schiller, most people experience both
drives either exclusively or alternately, but rarely together at once.77 However, should we
experience both drives as a unity we would have a more insightful understanding of what
it is to be “human”, in the normative sense. The next logical movement requires that we
synthesize both drives, thereby transcending their opposition. Specifically, Schiller is
most interested in what is developed through the unification of form and matter, he says:
“The synthesis results when the sensate quality of the one combines with the reasonable

76 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.85
77 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p.22
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quality of the other and man is set in freedom, both physically and morally.”

78

•

The third

impulse, which arises from the synthesis of the form-drive and the sense-drive, is the
Play-drive. It is the complimentary interaction of both drives that allows for the playdrive to unite both: since the sense drive wants to be determined and to receive objects
and the form drive seeks to determine and produce objects, then the play drive “will
endeavour so to receive as if it had itself brought forth, and so to bring forth as the
. .

.

.

intuitive sense aspires to receive.

5*79

Furthermore, the play-drive allows the individual to transform the physical and
formal, so that he is free from the constraints of the sense drive, and from the moral
tyranny of the rational drive. He says:
Assuming that cases of this sort could actually occur in
experience, they would awaken in him a new drive which,
precisely because the other two drives co-operate within it, would
be opposed to each of them considered separately and could
justifiably count as a new drive. The sense-drive demands that
there shall be change and that time shall have a content; the form
drive demands that time shall be annulled and that there shall be
no change. That drive, therefore, in which both the others work in
concert (permit me for the time being, until I have justified the
term, to call it the play-drive), the play-drive, therefore, would be
directed towards annulling time within time, reconciling
becoming with absolute being and change with identity.80
Schiller tells us the sense drive constrains the mind by natural laws and the form drive
constrains the mind by rational laws. Through the play-drive, Schiller says, the
constraints on the mind are removed and the individual is set free. For example, I may

78 Regin, Deric. Freedom and Dignity: The Historical and Philosophical Thought o f Schiller. Martinus
Nijhoff Ed., The Hague, Netherlands. 1965, p .126
79 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p.97
80 Schiller, Fifteenth Letter, p.97
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take material from the physical realm (say a guitar) and material from the formal realm,
such as the musical notes and, by combining both, play; and though I am still bound by
the musical notes, I am still free to interpret them in a unique way. Therefore, the playdrive involves both receptivity and creativity on the part of the individual, creating the
ideal human being.
But that is not all. Schiller further explains that the moment we begin to play we
are free to manipulate form and content, while at the same time respecting the boundaries
of reason and nature i.e. physical and moral laws (ex. Gravity, Justice). We become
complete human beings and develop as a unity of Nature and Reason. He says “For, to
mince matters no longer, man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a
human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays.”81 This means that
when I play I become a living-form, a synthesis of receptivity and creativity, “Only when
his form lives in our feeling and his life takes on form in our understanding, does he
become living form; and this will always be the case whenever we judge him beautiful.”82
As such, human nature involves creating our own nature, based on the union of both
drives. Therefore, the play-drive “constitutes wholeness, totality, simultaneity” it
represents the union of oppositions, of change and permanence.83 It is both passive and
active at once, producing things and receiving them at the same time, satisfying the
demands of the body and the mind.84 We become imaginative, self-creating beings.
Before going further, it is first necessary to enrich our understanding of Play,

81 Ibid, p. 107
82 Ibid, p. 101
83 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p.22
84 Ibid, p.22
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specifically to distinguish the concept of Play from Work. Play is an activity that is done
for its own sake, without any goal or motive. We may sing, paint, or walk simply for our
own pleasure, that we obtain from doing the activity.

QC

,

,

.

Conversely, Work is an activity

that is done for some reward, or in order to achieve a particular goal. However, Schiller
acknowledges, this is not to say that work is not necessarily a bad thing, rather it becomes
the central focus of a given society.86 Work can be a very satisfying and rewarding
activity, but he warns us that we must be cautious not to make it as the only valuable
activity.
Furthermore, we must note that play is not necessarily opposed to ‘rulefollowing’; though it may be a way to make the task of ‘following rules’ more enjoyable.
For example, I may play a song on a guitar by following the exact notes for that song, and
I may also play with the song e.g. playing the notes a different scale, adding more notes
to the song, adding electrical distortion as opposed to playing it on an acoustic guitar etc.
On the other hand, a child may pick up a guitar and simply hammer his or her hands on it,
fully content with exploring the different sounds it produces. The child’s activity may still
be called ‘play’ because it involves both reception and creativity (no matter how horrible
the instrument may sound). Therefore, play extends to activities that involve specific
rules, as well as activities with no goals other than exploration.
It is precisely the non-instrumental, intrinsically valuable aspect of Play that
distinguishes it from work. As soon as there is a definite, utilitarian dimension to the
851 may play a casual game o f street hokey with friends for enjoyment purposes. Whereas if I were to play
professional hockey, my enjoyment has nothing to do with the end (goal) which is to win, over the other
team
86 The importance o f work, and the degree to which it may be productive without encroaching too much on
the individual’s life, is discussed in much more detail by Marcuse. Borrowing from Sigmund Freud, Karl
Marx, and the Frankfurt School, Marcuse develops the necessary social and political concepts that will
concretize Schiller’s point. I will explain this dimension o f Marcuse’s theory in the next two chapters.
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activity, it ceases to be Play and becomes work. He says: “Seen in this way, play and
•

work take on a different meaning and are equivalent to freedom and servitude.”

87

But we

must remember that Play cannot be the only life activity for humans, since we would not
get any work done. And we must further keep in mind that while acknowledging the
importance of play and freedom, we must not neglect our social duties, i.e. duties that
allow us maintain social development. Although Schiller does not fully explore the
importance o f work and social services in a Western capitalist economy, he does propose
an important analysis of the social problems that can arise when we make “servitude” the
focus of human life. Therefore, the difference between both kinds of activities seems
clear: play is done for its own sake, and work involves some kind of reward or goal; and
further, in excess either activity can be problematic.
Schiller tells us that the sense drive constrains the mind by natural laws and the
form drive constrains the mind by rational laws. Through the play-drive, Schiller says, the
constraints on the mind are removed and the individual is set free. The sense of freedom
that Schiller advocates arises from man’s whole nature, through the play drive. In other
words, for Schiller, human freedom is expressed through aesthetic activity because
liberates us from the confines of both drives. Indeed, Schiller tells us, the play-drive
exists due to rational necessity.88
In the Fifteenth Letter Schiller draws our attention to a central point concerning
the play-drive and beauty. He tells us that the object of the sense-drive is life, and it is
associated with the physical world and our physical senses. The object of the form-drive

87 Ibid, p.22
88 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) N ew York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p. 103
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is thought, and it is associated with our rational faculty. Since the play-drive is a
compound o f both drives, its object is living-form “A concept serving to designate all the
aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we
call beauty.”89 Likewise, beauty is also made up of two elements: it has life because we
can sense and feel it, and it has form because we can think it.90 Also, like play, beauty
possesses intrinsic value. More importantly, play and beauty both share the produce the
same liberating effect for the individual. Both provide the necessary grounds for the
cultivation of the potentialities whose realization produces a complete and unified human
being. Therefore, play and beauty have the same liberating effect on the person because
they both resolve the conflict between the form-drive and the sense-drive: Both allow the
individual to develop a multi-dimensional human life.91

CONCLUSION:

Until now I have explored the key aspects concerning the fragmented human
being: the two opposing drives (the sensuous and the formal) and the demands they place
on the individual, the consequences of being ruled by either drive exclusively, the playdrive, and the healing powers of the aesthetic. Schiller has taught us that human beings
are multi-dimensional creatures with many talents and abilities: we are individuals who
are able to combine form and matter with the help of our imaginative faculty, and become

89 Ibid, p. 101
90 Simons, John D. Friedrich Schiller. Ulrich Weisstein Ed. Twayne’s World Authors Series. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981, p.22
91 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a Series o f Letters. Wilkinson. E.M. &
Willoughby, L.A. (Eds.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 1967, p .103-105
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creators. As such, he encourages us to develop the sensuous as well as the rational
faculties, and not simply one or the other.
Furthermore, Schiller stresses the importance of an aesthetic education so that
individuals may improve themselves, since it will ultimately lead to the improvement of
civilization. Furthermore, it is the task of every person to strive towards this union of
oppositions and as such we must play. Therefore, we might consider Schiller’s theory as a
prescription against a common illness plaguing human kind: the fragmented human
character. Following his advice, we may finally be able to achieve a wholeness that
allows us to build a more fulfilling human existence. However, the problem with
Schiller’s theory is that its focus on individual education seems to lack the socio
economic concepts necessary to fully understand the cause of specialization/
instrumentalization and human fragmentation. Thus, for Schiller, the problem is that the
individual fails to unify both drives, but individuals cannot simply will away social
forces, even with an aesthetic education.
Moreover, Schiller does not completely address the importance of work and the
benefits of social cohesion. With that in mind, while we must be sensitive to social
context in which Schiller worked, we must also understand that the improvement of
society requires us to go beyond an aesthetic education of humankind. Specifically,
although we may be able to identify a kind of pseudo-enlightenment that jeopardizes the
freedom of the individual in Western Capitalist society, we need more than an aesthetic
education to solve many of the problems. For example, we must fully acknowledge the
importance of work and social services, which Schiller does not, since both seem to be
important for the development of almost any physical society. Therefore, although
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Schiller has identified a major social problem, we must look elsewhere to develop an
understanding of the socio-political concepts required to fully address that problem. In
the second chapter, I will examine Marcuse’s theory in Eros and Civilization, where he
draws on both Freud’s work as well as Schiller. In particular, Marcuse will examine the
roots of social repression beginning with Freud, and then the possibility of liberation
through Schiller’s aesthetic education.
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CHAPTER 2: MARCUSE AND AESTHETICS

I will begin to develop the social and political concepts necessary for further
understanding the problem of individual fragmentation, with reference to Marcuse’s Eros
and Civilization. Here he considers elements from Sigmund Freud’s theory of human
instincts and Schiller’s theory of aesthetics to explicate his own understanding of the
basis o f a solution to the problem of the fragmentation and instrumentalization of human
powers. First he critically examines Sigmund Freud’s concepts of repression and the
reality principle, in order to understand possible social and historical factors that promote
social repression, and specifically the repression of sensuousness.92 Second, Marcuse
recognizes the possible application of Schiller’s concept of ‘play’, not only to the social
and political spheres but also for human life in general. Specifically, Marcuse was
intrigued by the liberation of sensuousness promised by the play-drive, because that
seems to be connected with true human freedom.93
I will begin by examining the section on “The Aesthetic Dimension” in Eros in
Civilization. This will link up with the first chapter, and will allow us to understand the
specific elements that Marcuse draws from Schiller’s theory of aesthetics and play.
Marcuse is most interested in the reconciling properties of play, i.e., its ability to tame the
conflict between the sense-drive and the form-drive. Specifically, Marcuse will use
Schiller’s concept of play to project the possibility of a liberated human sensuousness.
The problem, he believes, is that the erotic energy of the sense-drive is sublimated in a
system-reproducing manner, and channeled towards expanding a capitalist system of
92 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. New York, 1980. p.94
93 The play-drive as explained in chapter one o f this thesis.
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production and consumption. Although, it is true that pleasure must be repressed to some
degree so that we may work on social development, Marcuse contends that the demand
for sensuous, erotic pleasure, is repressed beyond the level that is necessary for the
preservation and development of society. Ideally, as Marcuse will go on to say, human
labor would take the shape of play, and in that sense become free, creative, imaginative
activity; as opposed to oppressive, mechanical and inhuman commotion. Therefore, I will
attempt to show how Marcuse wants to apply the reconciling powers of the aesthetic and
the play-drive to the liberation of human sensuousness. This is important particularly
when considering the tension between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.
Next, without digressing into elements of Freud’s theory that are not central to
present purposes, I will explicate the technical terms that Marcuse uses in his theory of
the individual, as well their role in the development of human civilization. Specifically, I
will identify the difference between Freud’s concepts of “pleasure principle”, which is
characterized by gratification, and “the reality principle” which is characterized by the
repression of the demands of the pleasure principle. Marcuse considers these concepts in
particular in order to develop his own concepts of “surplus-repression and the
performance principle.” This will help us understand the dynamics between the pleasure,
reality, and performance principle as humans attempt to establish the laws and demands
of both to social and personal development. However, as I will demonstrate, Marcuse
shows us that the performance principle successfully represses the demands of the
pleasure principle.94

In contrast to the reality principle, the performance principle

94 Marcuse will go on to explain the point that gratification does require a certain level o f repression, in
order to develop civilization: we may think o f the saying “work now and play later”, however, the capitalist
system o f production, he will argue, demands us to work as much as possible, and to make sure we get
enough rest before the next shift. Most o f the individual’s time is there fore spent working, and when they
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represses a person’s demand for gratification over and above the level that is required for
the improvement o f civilization. Thus, the performance principle, he will argue, not only
discourages the development of Schiller’s “complete human being”, but also leads to
human need-deprivation and environmental degradation.

SCHILLER AND MARCUSE; THE RELEVANCE OF SCHILLER’S LETTERS

As I ended, Schiller wrote the aesthetic letters under the influence o f Kant’s
Critique o f Judgment. In this sense, his letters aim at reconstructing human civilization
through the emancipatory powers of Aesthetics. The term “Aesthetics” Marcuse says, was
originally defined as “pertaining to the sense”, with emphasis on the cognitive function of
the senses.95 The cognitive function of the senses, according to Kant, is both receptive
and creative, allowing us to experience beauty and pleasure.96 However, Marcuse argues,
the dominance of Reason undermines the cognitive function of sensuousness by
repressing the need for pleasure satisfaction.

Marcuse argues that this repression is

required by the social demand that everyone become productive members of society. This
means that the senses are viewed as mere receptive antennas that do not play a role in the
development of a free society, only the reproduction of systemic goals that are ultimately
economically driven. As such, human awareness (cognition) becomes associated with the
faculty of reason, whereas the senses simply feed the ’higher’ faculty of reason with
are not working they are simply resting between work shifts. This leaves very little room (in some cases
non) for the cultivation o f human talents and ability or ‘play’.
95 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p.180
96 Ibid. p.176, This is a very short version o f Marcuse’s discussion o f the mechanics o f Kant’s concept of
beauty and aesthetics. As I am not examining Kant’s work in this project, a more detailed discussion may
be found in Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization.
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information. The faculty o f reason then takes that information and organizes it according
to laws of reason, while completely discounting the laws of pleasure. Marcuse says,
In line with the repressive concept of reason, cognition became
the ultimate concern of the “higher,” non-sensuous faculties of the
mind; aesthetics were absorbed by logic and metaphysics.
Sensuousness, as the “lower” and ever “lowest” faculty, furnished
at best the mere stuff, the raw material, for cognition, to be
organized by the higher faculties of the intellect.97
As a result, sensuousness, one’s own subjective experience o f pleasure, which cannot be
measured and computed, is disregarded as socially useful. This means that an individual’s
subjective experience o f pleasure is not considered to provide any sort of measurable
contribution to the development of civilization. Moreover, the elements that are ignored
are those related to human creativity and imagination—the faculty that represents objects
without their being “present,” the ability to play with form and matter and freely shape
the world according to the pleasure principle.

OS

The concept o f sensuousness maintains that our senses are the “sources and
organs of cognition.”99 However, the senses are not the exclusive or even the primary
organs of cognition. The cognitive function of the senses, Marcuse explains, is confused
with their appetitive function (which is sensuality). As noted earlier, the cognitive
function of the senses is governed by the pleasure principle. Thus the cognitive function
of the senses, Marcuse explains, strives for pleasure that is not simply physical and

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid, p. 181
Marcuse is quite clear about this point, when he talks about how sensuousness is
undermined to the point o f pure ridicule “Those o f its processes that did not fit into the rationalistic
epistemology—that is, those that went beyond the passive perception o f data—became homeless. Foremost
among these homeless contents and values were those o f imagination: free, creative, or reproductive
intuition o f objects which are not directly “given”—the faculty to represent objects without their being
“present.”
99 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p.183-84
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receptive, it strives for aesthetic pleasure and beauty.100 Furthermore, the cognitive
function involves the senses as the organs that provide the imagination with information,
which it may then manipulate and play with.101 On the other hand, the appetitive function
of the senses allows for the satisfaction of the need for instant physical gratification, and
is much more about reception.

The result of this confusion is a conception of

sensuousness as a passive, receptive, and unproductive dimension, which does not
coincide with the values of the established reality principle.102 But we know from what
has been said thus far that sensuousness is more than just receptive.
Philosophy, Marcuse explains, has done little to resolve this confusion between
sensuousness and sensuality, or the cognitive and appetitive functions of the senses. And
that is why is has been difficult for philosophy to provide an account of what a “liberated
sensuousness” might look like.103 As such, its only reasonable refuge was in the theory of
aesthetics.
From this fusion of the cognitive and appetitive functions derives
the confused, inferior, passive character of sense-cognition, which
makes it unsuitable for the reality principle unless subjected to
and formed by the conceptual activity of the intellect, of reason.104
Sensuousness gains freedom from the dominance of reason and finds expression in the

100 At this point we may recall Schiller, who also believed that human beings have a need for aesthetic
pleasure as well as physical pleasure.
101 It is important for me to note that unless stated otherwise I will be using the term “play” as Schiller
meant it: Play as the activity o f combining form and content according to the laws o f the physical world and
the laws o f human imagination.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. p. 184,
“liberated sensuousness” in this case refers to a conception o f sensuousness that is not
subordinated to the rule o f reason.
104 Ibid, p. 184,
Marcuse quotes Otto Rank in order to explain the claim that Art challenges reason “Art
challenges the prevailing principle o f reason: in representing the order o f sensuousness, it invokes a tabooed
logic—the logic o f gratification as against that o f repression. Behind the sublimated aesthetic form, the
unduplicated content shows forth: the commitment o f art to the pleasure principle.”
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realm of aesthetics. The truth of art, according to Marcuse, its goal, is to liberate
sensuousness by reconciling it with reason, thus canceling the opposition between both.
This is precisely a reference to Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic, as the mediating
force between Nature and Reason. Therefore, the conflict within the individual is
revealed as one between the logic of gratification and the logic of repression: the
gratification o f the instincts and the need for aesthetic pleasure on the one hand, and the
repression o f those needs and demands for that pleasure. Unless the need for gratification
conforms to the laws o f the reason, it will be counter-productive to social development.105
This is true only relative to the performance principle of capitalism, since ‘the laws of
reason’ reflect the demands of the performance principle, which center on: productivity
for the sake of increasing profit, requiring more work and less play.
Marcuse argues that the need for definite social changes change was obvious
during the time Schiller wrote the letters. Indeed, as we have seen, Schiller drew our
attention to the dangers of alienation, as ‘reason’ was used to justify the killing and
murder of many people during his time. Marcuse explains that with the rise of industrial
society individual productivity was directed by the performance principle within an
industrial system that produced far more than was necessary to maintain life and enable
the development o f valuable human powers. As a result, the individual develops as a
fragmented being and is used as a mere tool for the progress of capitalist productivity.

105 As I will go on to explain later “social development” amounts, largely, to the demands and laws o f “the
reality principle”.
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The individual’s humanity is fragmented since he or she only develops his or her
occupation rather than ‘the whole being’.106
Marcuse explains that Schiller explicitly recognizes that civilization is
responsible for the impoverished conception of the individual, which reduces a human
being to the status o f a tool. History shows us the development of human civilization
came with the sacrifice o f much human life, not to mention destruction on a global scale
due to incredibly violent wars (using weapons o f mass destruction as opposed to arrows
and swords). But an impoverished conception of humanity has its clear consequences.
Instead of being creative and productive individuals in reality, whose life is filled with
personal interests and need satisfaction, they are reduced to the status of productive tools.
This reduction allows atrocities, ranging from the slavery o f many people and races, to
the burning of women who were suspected of being servants of the Devil. Marcuse
affirms that Schiller’s concept of play, in contrast, represents the philosophical basis of a
holistic conception o f human freedom and fulfillment. And while we acknowledge the
productive capacities o f the individual and the need to exploit human capabilities to a
certain degree, that new mode of civilization considers individual human powers and their
all-round development as of paramount importance.107

106 Ibid, p. 186,
Marcuse refers to a specific passage in Schiller’s Letters to describe how labor is kept
separate from the pleasure principle, and strictly under the rule o f the performance principle “.. .enjoyment
is separated from labor, the means from the end, exertion from recompense. Eternally fettered only to a
single little fragment o f the whole, man fashions himself only as a fragment; ever hearing only the
monotonous whirl o f the wheel which he turns, he never develops the harmony o f his being, and, instead o f
shaping the humanity that lies in his nature, he becomes a mere imprint o f his occupation, his science.”
107 This new mode o f civilization would not completely abolish work and labor, only inhuman labor, and
inhuman conditions. Though there are many conditions to be considered for this new mode o f civilization,
such as the economic and social impact it would have, this conception basically gives us something to aim
for.
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To understand what this higher conception of the individual might look like,
Marcuse notes, we begin by examining the root of the problem as Schiller identifies it.
Schiller, Marcuse explains, attributes the fragmentation o f the individual to the
antagonism between sense and reason, matter and form, the particular and the universal.
As I noted in the first chapter, each of these dimensions is governed by either the sensedrive or the form drive. The former is receptive while the latter is active.108 This conflict,
as Schiller stresses, must be resolved if we are to ever reclaim humanity and reconstruct
human civilization. This reconciliation between the opposed drives is accomplished, as I
explained earlier, through the play drive. With Schiller’s theory of aesthetics in mind,
Marcuse draws the implication that in play, “reason is sensuous and sensuousness
rational.” This refers to Schiller’s claim that the play-drive cancels the tensions between
sense and reason, as both are working together, as opposed to having one drive rule over
the other.
However, this does not necessarily mean that individuals will have a clear
conception o f freedom, justice and morality. Rather, the individual becomes more open
and receptive towards new forms of such concepts. The result is
A conception o f an aestheticized and eroticized subjectivity that
preserves the connotation of Sinnlichkeit as pertaining to
sensuality, receptiveness, art, and Eros, thus redeeming the body
and the senses against the tyranny of repressive reason and
affirming the importance of aesthetics, play, and erotic activity in
human life.”109
108 Ibid, p. 186-87 Marcuse reiterates the opposition between both drives as discussed by Schiller “Culture
is built by the combination and interaction o f these two impulses. But in the established civilization, their
relation has been an antagonistic one: instead o f reconciling both impulses by making sensuousness rational
and reason sensuous, civilization has subjugated sensuousness to reason in such manner that the former, if
it reasserts itself, does so in destructive and “savage” forms, while the tyranny o f reason impoverishes and
barbarizes sensuousness.”
109

Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001, p.87-88
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Therefore, the play-drive synthesizes our receptive and creative faculties (the sense-drive
and the form-drive).
Though Marcuse agrees with Schiller’s conception of the individual and the
liberating qualities art, their views on politics differ greatly. Whereas for Schiller “the
liberation o f man from inhuman existential conditions” is solved through aesthetic
education alone, since “beauty leads to freedom.”110, for Marcuse, more specific social
and political changes are necessary. Nevertheless, for both, the play-drive is the vehicle
for liberation as “ ...the play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion—the
manifestation o f an existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of
freedom itself.”111 Human beings are free, when the development of their potential is
constrained by neither social laws or unmet material needs. Furthermore, Marcuse
continues, since this constraint over human beings is exercised by the established reality,
freedom has to mean: liberation from that established reality. As such, the ideal of human
life, for Marcuse, is governed by a sensuous reason, which protects and enhances human
life. As the barriers o f repression are removed human beings may evolve freely, and
attempt to organize social relations so as to make “lasting gratification” possible.112
Therefore, Freedom within reality means that individuals are able to satisfy wants and
1

n

needs without having to engage in repressive work.

Repressive-work in this sense

amounts to repetitive, inhuman labor whereby the interests and goals of the individual are

110 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p. 187
111 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p .187
112 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001. p.88-89
113 Repressive work may also be thought o f as Marx’s alienated labor, which describes the relationship
between workers and their work.
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directed towards, first and foremost, profit increase. Non-repressive work is just the
opposite, in that while it still consists of some degree of exploitation of human
capabilities, the value o f the private interests and goals of the individual is acknowledged
without sacrificing one’s dignity as a human being. Thus, the purpose of non-repressive
work is to instrumentally increase profit, but instead to interact with and transform nature
according to human imagination “Then, man is free to “play” with his faculties and
potentialities and with those of nature, and only by “playing” with them is he free. His
world is then display, and its order is that of beauty.”114
Marcuse explains that for Schiller, aesthetics may become the governing principle
of humanity if it first becomes a universal. For Schiller, aesthetics begins at the individual
level, but eventually it must be translated to the rest of humanity. As well, “Aesthetic
culture presupposes a “total revolution in the mode of perception and feeling,” and such
revolution becomes possible only if civilization has reached the highest physical and
intellectual maturity.” He means that all of human civilization must become liberated, and
recognize the over-exploitative demands placed on individuals.115 For example, as I have
mentioned before, though we must exploit our ability to work and create in order to
develop human civilization, over-exploitation occurs when the individual is viewed as
nothing more than a natural resource to be used by corporations, to increase profits. Such
an individual is forced to lose sight of their whole humanity, as Schiller says, and instead
is only focused on developing their ability to be a productive member of the system of
production.

114 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p. 188
115 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p. 189
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Also, Marcuse explains, it is only when human beings acquire the qualities of
aesthetic education i.e., play and creativity, that they are able to transform human
civilization. This freedom to transform human civilization through play is made possible
through human imagination, which projects the different possibilities of human existence.
By playing with form and the matter supplied to it by the mental faculty and the objective
world (Nature), human imagination plays a role in shaping human civilization.116
Therefore, the maturity o f humanity requires an aesthetic education, because it allows us
to resolve the tensions between the form and sense-drives, and understand aesthetic
experience as a both receptive and creative activity.
Once the play-drive ascends to a position where it becomes the governing
principle of human civilization, nature (the objective world) is experienced as “the object
of contemplation.”

11 7

This point means that we perceive the world, both natural and

social/political, as a realm o f possibility that is shaped according to the free-play of
human imagination. As such, our perception of Nature as dominating or as the object of
instrumental domination is transformed. And though it is not fully possible to completely
cut off the ties o f exploitation and domination from Nature, as it is still used as a means to
life in general, it is possible to reduce waste and over-consumption. Correspondingly, the
subjective world is also transformed. Marcuse tells us that aesthetic experience also tames
“violent and exploitative productivity” that turns human beings into tools of labor.118
This means that human life is still highlighted by activity and productivity, for example
individuals would still work and participate in the community. However what the
individual “possesses and produces need bear no longer the traces of servitude, the fearful
116 Ibid.
1,7 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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design of its purpose”; beyond want and anxiety, human activity becomes display—the
free manifestation o f potentialities.”119 As such, human activity would not be prescribed
by the parameters o f instrumental rationality. The result for human beings is that they
become ‘realms of possibility’, and the aesthetic individual realizes the self according to
the ffee-play of the imagination.
The drive behind the ideal of aesthetic education is that morality should be based
on sensuous grounds. To be sure, the sense-drive must be governed by freedom. Schiller
tells us that the transformation of society begins at the individual level. But only a free
and autonomous individual is able to bring about the harmony between individual and
universal gratification.120 As such, “in a truly free civilization, “the will of the whole”
fulfills itself only “through the nature of the individual.”121 Before social change can
begin to take place, individuals must learn to synthesize the tension between Nature and
Reason. And aesthetic education allows us to resolve that tension. Marcuse notes the
similarity between the reconciling elements of play to those between the reality principle
and the pleasure principle. He says,
Imagination preserves the objectives of those mental processes
which have remained free from the repressive reality principle; in
their aesthetic function, they can be incorporated into the
conscious rationality of mature civilization. The play impulse
stands for the common denominator of the two opposed mental
19?
processes and principles.

119 Ibid, p. 190 Specifically we should not undermine the importance o f liberating sensuousness whenever
we speak about liberating humanity, since the liberation o f the senses promotes the liberation o f humanity
as a whole. Marcuse says “Freedom would have to be sought in the liberation o f sensuousness rather than
reason, and in the limitation o f the “higher” faculties in favor o f the “lower,” In other words, the salvation
o f culture would involve abolition o f the repressive controls that civilization has imposed on sensuousness.
And this is indeed the idea behind the Aesthetic Education”.
120 Ibid, p. 190-91
121 Ibid, p. 190
122 Ibid, p. 193-94
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The activity of play, he says, has the same reconciling effect between the sense-drive and
the form-drive, and also between the reality principle and the pleasure principle. Through
the activity o f play the individual is free to shape reality according to the pleasure
principle, so that repression is kept to a minimum, labor is not inhuman, and thus the laws
of both principles conform to one another. Past experiences of happiness and freedom are
preserved in memory, and with the help of the imagination they are incorporated into the
development of a better human life.
Reconciling both mental processes (drives) and the principles have the potential to
liberate human beings. Since both views aim to establish a non-repressive social order,
both are committed to the concept of freedom in this sense. Marcuse establishes a link
between aesthetic philosophy and the images of Orpheus and Narcissus, in order to
elaborate on the concept of a non-repressive social order
Still another element links the aesthetic philosophy with the
Orphic and Narcissistic images: the view of a non-repressive
order in which the subjective and objective world, man and
nature, are harmonized. The Orphic symbols center on the singing
god who lives to defeat death and who liberates nature, so that the
constrained and constraining matter releases the beautiful and
playful forms o f animate and inanimate things. No longer striving
and no longer desiring “for something still to be attained,” they
are free from fear and fetter— and thus free per se. The
contemplation of Narcissus repels all other activity in the erotic
surrender to beauty, inseparably uniting his own existence with
nature.123
In the same way, Marcuse says, aesthetic philosophy conceives of a non-repressive order
in which nature “in man and outside man becomes freely susceptible to “law”—the laws
of display and beauty.”

This non-repressive order possesses an essential quality:

123 Ibid, p. 194
It will not be necessary for me to get into too much detail about the Orphic and
Narcissistic images in Marcuse’s writing. Though if the reader is interested, Marcuse provides a detailed
explanation in his work (see Eros and Civilization)

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Abundance. Marcuse explains “Non-repressive order is essentially an order of
abundance: The necessary constraint is brought about by “superfluity” rather than
need.”124 But when we think of “superfluity” we should keep in mind that Marcuse does
not mean the superfluity o f mass produced commodities (weapons, televisions, cars) but
rather the superfluity o f true need-satisfying natural resources (food, water, medicine).
This means that the distribution of natural resources must be equal across the globe,
instead of being concentrated in the hands of a few countries. Indeed Marcuse claims, the
only order that is compatible with true human freedom is that of abundance.125 And
rightly so, an individual cannot be free if he or she does not possess the necessary basic
resources for life.126 Furthermore, he continues, this is precisely where both the idealists
and the materialist agree: a non-repressive order is possible only when human civilization
has matured to a stage where it demands and insists on true human freedom.127
Now according to both materialism and idealism, Marcuse says, the notion of
freedom that is governed under the rule of the performance principle forces people to
compete for basic needs. Competition for the basic needs of life is inhuman because the
obvious advantage that some social classes have over others, and means that the
satisfaction o f the ruling classes demands for luxury will be satisfied at the cost of
depriving the lower classes of even their basic needs. Instead, Marcuse explains, both

124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 The poor people o f third world countries cannot be free no matter how hard they try, since they have
enough trouble securing food and clean water. As such Marcuse’s conception o f human freedom requires
the equal distribution and abundance o f natural resources.
127 At this point we might want to question whether or not abundance o f resources may be attained within
the limits o f the harmonious relationship with Nature. Marcuse does not consider the strain that will be
placed on the environment in order to lift human beings to a new and better level o f development. The
energy and resources required to free humanity may end up placing a greater strain on the environment.
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idealists and materialists want to base the concept of freedom on a “universally gratified
existence of needs.” This view tells us that this particular realm o f freedom lies beyond
the realm of necessity “freedom is not within but outside the struggle for existence.”
Although the struggle for existence never ends we may be capable of conceiving ways to
reduce its negative impacts (disease, famine, socialization etc.). Thus, this particular
understanding of the concept of freedom says that the basic needs for any human
individual are “the prerequisite, rather than the content, of a free society.”128 This of
course means an end to competition over the basic needs and resources required by all
human beings (food, water, medicine etc.)
On the other hand, the realm of necessity (labor) does not coincide with freedom
because, Marcuse explains, “the human existence in this realm is determined by
objectives and functions that are not its own and that do not allow the free play of human
faculties and desires.”129 Ideally, human labor, the transformation of nature according to
the imaginative faculties of the play-drive, belongs to human beings. However, because
individuals are involved in a system that undermines their creative capacities and
suppresses sensuousness, their creations are not developed by their own imaginations.130
This means that in the realm of necessity the best conditions for human life are dictated
by the standards of reason rather than the standards of freedom “namely, to organize
production and distribution in such a manner that the least time is spent for making all

128 Ibid, p. 195
129 Ibid.
130 Karl Marx’s concept o f “alienation”, discussed in The Manuscripts o f 1844 . should come to mind when
we think o f the relationship between humans and labor in the realm o f necessity. As Marcuse explains, in
the realm o f necessity ‘human labor’ does not belong to human beings, because individuals are alienated
from their world, [might want to see what M has to say about alienation in his “The Philosophical
Foundations o f Historical Materialism]

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

necessities available to all members of society.”

1T 1

However, “individuality cannot be a

value and end in itself’ because labor, Marcuse explains, is transformed into a system of
•

•

•

inhuman activity.

1T9

•

•

•

•

•

Therefore, human existence is undermined in the realm of socially

determined necessity (Western capitalism), and the solution to the improvement of
culture consists in at least these two points: 1- The liberation of sensuousness, 2- a change
in the social, political, and economic forces that repress and constrict the possibility for
human freedom.
The relevance of Schiller to Marcuse, thus far, should be clear: Schiller diagnoses
the problem of humanity as a split within the individual, between Nature and Reason. The
tension between the sense-drive and the form-drive is resolved through the play-drive.
This is precisely what Marcuse found so appealing about Schiller’s theory of aesthetics: It
involves both the liberation o f sensuous energy as well as the creative manipulation of
form and content. But this is not enough for Marcuse, since there are social and political
conditions that require more than an aesthetic education, and art alone cannot stimulate
social change. Specifically, the performance principle, which I will go on to discuss in the
following section, demands the highest amount of productivity and the least amount of
pleasure, and thus reduces the individual to a tool that is used to perpetuate the growth of
the system.

131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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EROS AND CIVILIZATION; PLEASURE VS. PERFORMANCE

First, it is important to understand the basic elements of Freud’s theory, which
will allow us to understand the principles of performance and pleasure.

177

According to

Freud, once the ego matures beyond the final stage of infantile sexual development, it
becomes completely dependent on the external world for gratification. Prior to this stage
however, the child gains gratification through the specific stage in its internal process of
development.134 The child seeks gratification from different objects, and also people,
through the “autoerotic stimulation of the oral, anal, and phallic zones, and generally
eroticized areas o f the body.”

17c

But because human relations are so complex and varied

“what is or is not gratifying easily appears to originate within social contexts rather than
within the individual.”136 The instincts, therefore, drive the organism to seek and fulfill
the demand for gratification.
However, instinctual theory must be qualified in order to provide a sufficient basis
for Marcuse’s critical theory: Since all social orders provide some sort of instinctual
gratification, instinct theory alone cannot distinguish between morally acceptable and
133 In the introduction to Eros and Civilization. Marcuse explains some important terms which are important
for reading the text: “the terms “Civilization” and “Culture” are used interchangeably as in Freud’s
Civilization and its Discontents. The terms “repression” and “repressive” are used in the non-technical
sense to designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes o f restraint, constraint,
and suppression. “Instinct” in accordance with Freud’s notion o f Trieb, refers to primary “drives” o f the
human organism which are subject to historical modification; they find mental as well as somatic
representation. Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955.
134 For a more detailed explanation on Freud’s psychosexual stages o f development see: Schoolman,
Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a division o f
Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. N ew York, 1980. p.91

135 Ibid. In Freudian terms this is called “polymorphous perversity”, which means attaining gratification
through all the different erogenous zones o f the body.
136 Ibid. Schoolman says we may question the concept o f gratification as “a definite need with universal
characteristics”, and though he does not explore this point in any detail at this point, he does draw our
attention to it as something to consider. However, He does provide an adequate conception o f gratification,
saying “the pleasurable release o f tension responsible for psychological and physical discomfort.”
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morally unacceptable gratification.137 For Marcuse, what is considered morally accepted
and morally unaccepted gratification seems to depend on more than just social standards
and values. It also seems to depend on whether or not the experience of pleasure is lifeaffirming. For example, consider the kind of pleasure that one may gain through the
consumption of mass-produced commodities versus pleasure that is experienced from
engaging in imaginative and creative activity (such as art). This point will be explored
further and in more detail throughout this section, but we should keep it in mind for now.
It is important to gain a deep understanding of the logic o f gratification, since, as
Marcuse tells us it contributes to the development of sensuous reason, and the possible
liberation o f the senses.138 In order to understand the logic of gratification we look to
Freud, who tells us that the history of western civilization is the history of its repression.
However, Marcuse believes that the undeveloped historical content of Freud’s argument
must be elaborated in order to understand the critical significance of the key points. In
particular, Marcuse emphasizes the different ways different levels of material culture
constrains both the biological existence and the instinctual structure of human beings. On
the one hand a basic level o f constraint is the precondition of the progress of civilization,
Left free to pursue their natural objectives, the basic instincts of
man would be incompatible with all lasting association and
preservation: they would destroy even where they unite.139
In general this constraint may be connected to Freud’s concept of polymorphous
perversity, in the sense that “the basic instincts” refer to a very immature ego that seeks
gratification through the different body’s different erogenous zones. On the other hand,

137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139

Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955. p. 11
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the level o f repression needed to ensure the reproduction of society is reduced as social
development increases. I will explain each moment in turn. To understand how the ego is
instructed to become a more mature and productive contributor to social development we
must begin with Freud’s concepts of Eros and Thanatos.
Marcuse distinguishes between the two drives or instincts that Freud identifies,
and claims that both permeate all of reality: Eros, the life instinct and Thanatos, the death
instinct. He explains,
Under non-repressive conditions, sexuality tends to “grow into”
Eros—That is to say, toward self-sublimation in lasting and
expanding relations (including work relations) which serve to
intensify and enlarge instinctual gratification. Eros strives for
“eternalizing” itself in a permanent order.140
Eros, being the dominant instinct by nature, tempers human beings so that they develop
receptive to non-aggressive relationships with both human beings and nature; this
becomes the basis of all social relations.141 However, Eros encounters the challenge of
existing within the realm of necessity. Marcuse continues, the conditions of “scarcity and
poverty” make it difficult for Eros to realize its laws in the world. And though progress in
technology, and evolution of human beings may bring us closer to realizing the demands
of Eros, it is not achieved without some degree of “alienated labor”.142 On the other hand
Thanatos, the death instinct, represents the ultimate obstacle to Eros: “The brute fact of
death denies once and for all the reality of a non-repressive existence.”143 The individual
realizes that joy and pleasure cannot last forever, because Eros exists within time and as
140 Ibid. p.222
141 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. New York, 1980. p.91
142 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955. p.222
l43Ibid, p.231
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such is subject to its laws. Eros seeks timeless joy within time, and that cannot be
fulfilled, as such Marcuse explains
The mere anticipation of the inevitable end, present in every
instant, introduces a repressive element into all libidinal relations
and renders pleasure itself painful. This primary frustration in the
instinctual structure of man becomes the inexhaustible source of
all other frustrations—and of their social effectiveness.144
Therefore, the individual experiences this tension between Eros and Thanatos as a threat

to the attainment of pleasure and gratification.
However, Marcuse reminds us that both instincts can be equally destructive if
they are not repressed and channeled properly. Both drives struggle to establish their need
for instant gratification in the world, or “gratification as such and as an end in itself, at
any moment”145, and tensions arise because culture cannot satisfy both instantaneously.
In this sense the instincts must be sublimated, and channeled towards socially beneficial
activity, and “Civilization begins when the primary objective—namely, integral
satisfaction of needs—is effectively renounced.”146

This basically means that the

destructive forces o f both drives must be channeled into socially beneficial activity, only
then does human civilization begin. The destructive powers of Eros may be understood in
terms of Freud’s polymorphous perversity, whereas the destructive properties of Thanatos
may be thought o f as the physical expiration of Eros. In this sense, then, we can
understand that left to its own devices Eros simply seeks permanent instinctual
gratification , and Thanatos serves as the constant reminder of the inability to do so.
Therefore, Marcuse concludes, civilization channels the energy o f Eros towards

repressive alienated labor, and uses the threat of Thanatos to maintain that level of
144 Ibid, p.231
145 Ibid, p. 11
146 Ibid.
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repression.
Marcuse then defines the transformation in the governing value system as follows:
the values of the instinct pass from instant gratification demands immediate satisfaction,
pleasure, joy (play), receptiveness and the absence of repression, to delayed satisfaction,
restrain o f pleasure, toil (work), productiveness and security. Furthermore, Freud
associates the first set o f values with the pleasure principle, and the second set of values
are associated with the reality principle. Therefore, Marcuse tells us, Freud describes this
change as the transformation of the pleasure principles into the reality principle.147
The instincts are sublimated in order to transform the “human animal” into a
“human being”, when both the “instinctual aims” as well as the “instinctual values—that
is, the principles that govern the attainment of the aims” are transformed. Furthermore,
Marcuse claims, as does Freud, human instincts as well as their need for gratification are
1

shaped by a socio-historical world.

AQ

This change has the goal of modifying human

instincts so that they benefit the progress of civilization. Therefore, the individual realizes
that instant gratification cannot be attained. Marcuse explains:
the reality principle supersedes the pleasure principle: man learns
to give up momentary, uncertain, and destructive pleasure for
delayed, restrained, but “assured” pleasure. Because of this lasting
gain through renunciation and restraint, according to Freud, the
reality principle “safeguards” rather than “dethrones,” “modifies,”
rather than denies, the pleasure principle.149
This means that the needs of human nature for instant gratification and the needs of social
organization are incompatible, since one set of needs gains ascendancy over the other.
But it seems counterintuitive to say that the needs of human nature are incompatible with

147 Ibid.
148 Ibid. p. 12
149 Ibid.
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the needs of social organization, because some human needs must be satisfied socially.
For example, human beings rely on social relations insofar as they have a desire or need
to reproduce, or to enjoy the company of others. However, these needs of human nature
must be repressed to a certain extent, in order to continue with the development of
society. In such case, the need for social organization is placed before the need for instant
gratification, since the latter would undermine any social progress.150
However, we should keep in mind that neither Marcuse, nor Freud is saying that
gratification must be completely repressed, only delayed. Freud argued that if instinctual
gratification is completely repressed, individuals develop neurotic habits that end up
harming them.151 Morton Schoolman explains the significance of Freud’s theory of
infantile sexuality for Marcuse
Psychosexual activity during these earliest phases of
development, when man is most directly influenced by (his own)
nature and gratification is explicitly sexual, proves that the first
value rooted in human nature, the first norm characteristic of its
moral disposition, is the need for instinctual gratification.152
This tells us that the first value of human nature is the satisfaction of the demands of
Eros. This first value, the need for instinctual gratification, must be repressed, and
delayed for the benefit o f cultural progress. The main issues of social organization do not
include the instant gratification of Eros. Instead, the established reality principle seeks to
transform the ego into an organized, rational, and moral entity and “becomes a conscious,

150 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. New York, 1980. p.91
151 Freud also believed that neurosis is the price we pay for civilization. But Marcuse rejects this particular
position o f Freud, believing that it is possible to develop an unrepressed and liberated human civilization,
and that depends in a large part on the social and political organization o f societies.
152 Ibid.
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thinking subject, geared to a rationality which is imposed on him from the outside.”

153

Schoolman continues
From the standpoint o f human nature, that which has truth value is
the happiness and freedom bred from the gratification of the
instincts through non-aggressive relations governed by the
pleasure principle. The hallmark of civilization’s morality of
productivity, on the other hand, is the denial o f freedom, the
frustration of happiness, and the suppression of truth—
suppression, but not elimination, as we now shall see.154
This is important because, as Marcuse believes that the liberation of humanity is based on
the liberation of those instinctual needs that have been completely repressed by the reality
principle. Therefore, Schoolman reiterates the point that the repression of Eros and its
demand for instant gratification should not be confused with the elimination of those
demands.
Before further discussing Freud’s concept of “Fantasy”, as well as the confusion
between the repression and the elimination of the pleasure principle, I will reiterate the
main points thus far, and link them towards Marcuse’s theory of radical subjectivity. First
of all, Marcuse draws on Freud to describe the social construction of subjectivity and the
opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.155 According to Freud,
human instincts are governed by the pleasure principle, which means that the instincts

153 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955. (p.14)
154 Ibid. p. 92
155 To be sure, Marcuse believes that we possess an organic/natural ‘first nature’, which he refers to in
Essay On Liberation. I will come back to this point in the third chapter o f this thesis, but for now it is
enough to say that for Marcuse the aim o f our ‘first nature’,, is to establish greater unities o f life, and to
project better possibilities for human life. Our ‘first nature’, however, is overshadowed by a socially
constructed nature that is imposed on us from the outside, by the external values o f the system o f
capitalism. The aim o f this second nature is to sustain the capitalist system o f production and consumption;
and while it may be necessary to do so the problem arises, according to Marcuse, because individuals
identify this ‘second nature’ as their ‘first nature’, so that the primary goal for human beings becomes ‘the
fulfillment o f the demands o f the market’ and not the search for greater unities o f life.
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simply seek gratification and pleasure. However, Freud also notes, at a very early stage
the pleasure principle confronts a hostile environment—hostile because it offers delayed
instead of instant gratification. Therefore, the individual learns to delay gratification and
play, in exchange for productivity.
On the other hand, the reality principle instructs the individual on how to behave,
what things to avoid, and what things to accept. “Under the tutelage of the reality
principle, the person learns what is useful and proved behavior, and what is harmful and
forbidden.”156 For example, children are taught proper social etiquette on how to behave,
and what to say. Thus, the individual seems to be shaped so as to become a “conscious,
thinking subject, geared to a rationality which is imposed on him from outside.” This
shows that, for Marcuse, individual rationality is socially constructed and imposed on the
person from the outside, and as such the subject “is the product of social experience.”157
Thus, the individual learns, at a very young age, that certain values facilitate social
interaction, which serve the purpose of maintaining the established reality principle.

FANTASY AND SURPLUS REPRESSION

Though the reality principle represses the demands of the human instincts and as
such the pleasure principle, one area in particular is kept free from its rule. According to
Freud, Marcuse tells us
Fantasy is “protected from cultural alterations” and stays
committed to the pleasure principle. Otherwise, the mental
156Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected Papers
o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 83
157 Ibid p.83
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apparatus is effectively subordinated to the reality principle. The
function o f “motor discharge,” which, under the supremacy of the
pleasure principle, had “served to unburden the mental apparatus
of accretions o f stimuli,” is now employed in the “appropriate
alteration of reality”: it is converted into action.158
Play, as imaginative and creative activity involving sensuousness and reason, shapes
reality. The role o f memory in fantasy is another important factor that Marcuse borrows
from psychoanalysis. We may understand what Marcuse has in mind by the role of
memory and fantasy by looking to Freud’s work. Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis
explains that individuals repress painful and traumatic memories and experiences. The
result is a suppression o f memory that may eventually lead to neurotic behavior.
Psychoanalysis aims at understanding suppressed memories and experiences, in order to
help free the person from neurosis.159 More importantly, Freud introduces the concept of
‘play’, as Schiller conceives it, to connect it with memory, pleasure and fantasy. In his
essay The Relation o f the Poet to Day-Dreaming, Freud writes
We ought surely to look in the child for the first traces of
imaginative activity. The Child’s best loved and most absorbing
occupation is play. Perhaps we may say that every child at play
behaves like an imaginative writer, in that he creates a world of
his own or, more truly he rearranges the things o f his world and
orders it in a new way that pleases him better. 60
Freud begins by establishing the link between play, imagination and creativity, in
childhood. He further explains that the child takes this world seriously insofar as he or
she invests much emotion towards. The child is also able to distinguish ‘play’ from

158 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955. p. 14
159 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 83
160 Freud, Sigmund, On creativity and the unconscious: papers on the psychology o f art. literature, love,
religion: The Relation o f the Poet To Day-Dreaming. New York: Harper Press, 1958, p.45
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‘reality’, because for the child reality is the opposite of play. The writer, Freud continues,
does the same thing as the child in that he or she creates a world of fantasy and
imagination. And though the writer, much like the child, invests much emotional energy
into the creation o f this fantasy world, the adult keeps it separate from reality. Therefore,
this is the part o f the mind that is still free from the clutches of the reality principle: Day
dreaming.
Furthermore, Freud tells us, individuals never completely cease to play even
though the established reality principle may require so. Play, for the adult individual,
takes on a different form as the activity of day-dreaming. The individual may then
remember past experiences o f childhood play and then compare the “would-be serious
occupations with his childhood’s play, he manages to throw off the heavy burden of life
and obtain the great pleasure of humor.”161 Fantasy, the activity of day-dreaming, as well
as play, are ruled by the pleasure principle and as such provide an outlet for the need for
gratification. And the need for gratification becomes apparent in Freud’s discussion of the
characteristics of day-dreaming.
We can begin by saying that happy people never make fantasies,
only unsatisfied ones. Unsatisfied whishes are the driving power
behind fantasies; every separate fantasy contains the fulfillment of
a wish, and improves on unsatisfactory reality.162
This should sound familiar because it brings us back to the issue of repression. To be sure
the kind of repressed wishes depend on the physical and social factors of the creator, i.e.
age, sex, environment etc. Also, Freud says, these repressed wishes may be grouped into

161 Ibid, p.45-46
162 Ibid, p.47-48
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two main categories: Ambitious, and Erotic.163 Finally, the activity of daydreaming
usually makes use o f early childhood memories when certain wishes were fulfilled. Freud
tells us that the act o f daydreaming “creates for itself a situation which is to emerge in the
future, representing the fulfillment of the wish—this is the day-dream or fantasy, which
now caries in it traces both of the occasion which engendered it and of some past
memory.” 164 Thus the act of daydreaming becomes a way to deal with the repressed,
unsatisfied wishes o f the individual.
Marcuse, on the other hand, offers a reconstruction of the role of memory which
suggests that it is possible to overview the oppressive aspects of the reality principle.
Because memory preserves the past experiences of happiness and freedom it is possible to
critically examine human civilization, by understanding its historical development. Rather
than viewing human history as a series of factual events it is essential to critically reflect
upon past errors, in order to guide positive future development.165 Therefore, Marcuse’s
point is to emphasize the importance of examining history, so that we may understand the
ways in which human freedom and happiness are repressed.166
It is clear, then, that for Marcuse, defending the claims of the pleasure principle is
synonymous with the rejection of oppressive social conditions. Freud as well considered
163 Ibid, p.48 Freud discusses the differences between Ambitious and Erotic wishes in his essay in more
detail. But for the purposes o f this project I will refrain from discussing those aspects o f Freud’s theory.
164 Ibid, p.48-49 Freud goes on to discuss an example to illustrate how a person’s wish “employs some even
in the present to plan a future on the pattern o f the past.” (Freud, p.49)
165 By critically exam ining history we understand why oppression i.e., slavery, suffragists, eventually leads
to revolution,. So we leam from our predecessors and attempt not to make the same blunders. This, in turn,
may lead to a more inclusive development o f human civilization. And though this matter deserves a
research project o f its own, we may get a glimpse and speculate on the positive gains o f developing a more
free civilization. Therefore, we should continue to critically understand history, because insofar as we value
the positive development o f humanity so that future civilization develops in a positive way i.e. less wars,
diseases, poverty etc.
166 Ibid. p. 84
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the idea that it is part o f human nature to strive for “happiness and freedom.”167 And
though Freud does not have an explicit theory of social oppression, he does draw our
attention to repressive social factors that contribute to human oppression. And we may
recall the role o f memory in conceiving better social conditions that facilitate the
achievement of happiness and freedom. “Marcuse holds that the “psychoanalytic
liberation of memory” and “restoration of fantasy” provide access to experiences of
happiness and freedom which are subversive of the present life. He suggests that Freud’s
theory of human nature, far from refuting the possibility of a non-repressive civilization,
indicates that there are aspects of human nature that are striving for happiness and
freedom.”

168

Therefore, Eros might tolerate delayed gratification and repression of the

instant demands for pleasure; however, Eros still seeks to fulfill its needs.
To some degree, repression is necessary for the progress of civilization. However,
repression is not to be confused with the elimination of Eros. The demands of the reality
principle become a problem when the demand for repression is above and beyond the
level that is required for social maintenance. Thus we now return to the social moment of
Marcuse’s argument which, recall, was the other, undeveloped side of Freud’s theory of
repression. Marcuse explains
a repressive organization of the instincts underlies all historical
forms of the reality principle in civilization. If he (Freud) justifies
the repressive organization of the instincts by the irreconcilability
between the primary pleasure principle and the reality principle,
he expresses the historical fact that civilization has progressed as
o r g a n iz e d dom ination .169

167 Ibid. p. 86
168 Ibid.
169 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p.35
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With Freud providing a basis, Marcuse shows how individuals are dominated and
oppressed by the same social norms that are meant to promote social progress.
Specifically, we are able to understand how the person internalizes social norms and
values, and as a result, conforms to the status quo. However, repression becomes a
1 *7A

problem when it is above and beyond the level required for cultural progress.

This

means that the performance principle, which demands the highest level of commitment to
work and productivity, and requires the total repression of the need for pleasure, is
problematic. The problem with the performance principle lies precisely within its laws
and demands, which seek to instrumentalize and sacrifice human life for the purposes of
Capitalist profit.
At this point I should note that Marcuse attempts to explain the social and political
aspects of Freud’s theory, which Kellner calls “a critical theory of socialization”. Most
theories of socialization focus on the “humanizing aspects by claiming that socialization
makes individuals more “human”—and thus legitimate social institutions and
practices.”171 However, Kellner continues, Freud exposes the repressive aspects of social
reality and the result o f its domination. Therefore, Marcuse argues, we need to develop
the necessary terms to understand the historical and social processes that contribute to
repression so that “with a change in these processes repression’s historical content, its
harshness, could change, too.”172

170 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001.
171 Ibid.
172 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. New York, 1980, p.94
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The social institutions that are established with the supposed duty of facilitating
human interaction, and helping humanity develop its potential; end up repressing,
reshaping, and policing the individual into a capitalist citizen. According to Stephen Eric
Bronner, this is a paramount characteristic of western capitalist society: the reality
principle becomes identified with the pleasure principle in order to transform individuals
into hard working, productive, and competitive consumers
As a consequence additional limits on gratification will be put
into effect above and beyond that minimum level of repression
which is indispensable for human interaction. Socialization will
occur in particular ways and progress will become identified with
the growth o f the existing order rather than with the attempt to
actualize the unactualized values of emancipation”.173
As a result, Bronner says, the growth and progress of civilization is understood as the
growth and progress o f the established reality principle i.e., Capitalism, rather than the
development o f freedom and happiness. To be sure, the established order attempts to
actualize values that will ensure the development of the system rather than the
emancipation of human beings. Though the values of competition, ever-increasing profits,
and production, become identified with human progress it is a mistake to confuse the
values of the system with the values of human beings. It is sufficient at this point to
mention that the values o f the system, for Marcuse, are internalized by the individual and
taken to be the true goals. Although he will also argue that we must be critical of those
values in order to guard ourselves against the illusion of freedom, it is helpful to keep in

173

Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988. 107-140
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mind the confusion o f systemic values and true human values. I will explore this idea
further in the next chapter.
Now, in order to understand “the historical content of the concepts repression and
reality principle,” Marcuse matches them with “corresponding terms denoting the specific
socio-historical component.” As a result, he exposes the relationship between the
concepts o f surplus-repression and the performance principle:
(a) Surplus-repression: the restrictions necessitated by social
domination. This is distinguished from (basic) repression: the
“modification” of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation
of the human race in civilization.
(b) Performance principle: the prevailing historical form of the
reality principle.174
Thus, Marcuse attempts to transform Marx’s “socially necessary and surplus labor” into
“basic and surplus repression.”
On the one hand, basic repression refers to the denial or delay of gratification,
which he regards as necessary for the development of “labor insuring survival.”175 On the
other hand, surplus-repression functions according to “a specific organization of
scarcity”, which is created through socially constructed needs. These socially constructed
needs, later referred to as false-needs by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man. may come in
the form o f mass produced commodities that are created for the purpose of being
consumed by the masses. As such, the consumption of these socially constructed needs
perpetuates the domination of the established reality principle over human freedom.
Schoolman explains

174 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1955, p.35
175 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. New York, 1980, p.94
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With the concept of surplus-repression, it is possible to
conceptualize unnecessary repression, or alienation, in biologicalinstinctual terms. It also allows us to reason that needs fulfilled
through surplus-repression, surplus labor not contributing directly
to the perpetuation of the human race, are false needs.176
As such, we are able to differentiate between necessary and unnecessary repression.
Furthermore, we may conclude that the fulfillment of socially constructed false needs,
made possible by surplus repression, does not in fact contribute to the liberation of
humanity. And as the production of these socially constructed false needs rises, so does
the amount of labor required to produce and consume them. As well, the level of
instinctual repression also rises accordingly, in order to open up more time for labor.
Therefore, the growth of the established performance principle, in this case being the
capitalist system, depends on the mass production and the mass consumption of socially
constructed false needs.
Furthermore, the values of Capitalism indoctrinate individuals to believe that
owning certain commodities is a need that facilitates life. However, it is a superficial
facilitation, one that is created for the individual and then sold in stores. For example,
advertisements and commercials tell people they need bigger, better and faster things:
bigger televisions, better CD players, and faster cars. The fulfillment of those socially
constructed needs becomes socially identified as happiness. This is problematic in two
ways: first, the concept o f happiness is reduced the particular experience of buying and
owning things; which then leads into the second part of the problem, as Bronner explains,
Individuals are trapped in a cycle of consumption that is created and maintained by
different social institutions. Religious and educational institutions, as well as the mass

176

Ibid. p.95
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media “become the instruments through which “surplus repression” is extracted and
maintained for the benefit o f the given order.”177 Surplus-repression, Bronner explains,
has its objective basis in the “false needs” that are endemic to the
production process of advanced industrial society. If “planned
obsolescence” can be used as an example, the system will
quantitatively create these needs which will then attempt to be
satisfied even as new ones are produced. The effects of this
production process will, however, also “reproduce” the repressive
values and desires of the existing order within individuals
themselves.178
This means that people are socialized to believe that the existing social order, including
its own definitions of the concepts of freedom, justice, and happiness, is the best one
possible. Also, because most people accept the given social order as the best possible,
they are discouraged from even attempting to conceptualize a better one. The repressive
values of the system multiply as the internalized demand for more production intensifies.
The problem with the existing social order is that it traps people within a cycle of
consumption and satisfaction of false needs, and stuns their ability to explore a deeper
understanding of concepts such as freedom and happiness, and their own selves.
Repressive social activity becomes the exact opposite of sublimated social
activity. We remember from Schiller that human beings are creative beings who must
strive to synthesize the conflicts between nature and reason. However, this cannot be
done within the capitalist system because individuals are forced to satisfy the demands of
the performance principle over and above their own. Furthermore, the death instinct
drives the system of production, its laws permeate the globe in the form of environmental

177 Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988. 107-140
178 Ibid. p. 110
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hazards, poverty, unequal distribution of resources, and most importantly the needless
suffering and death of human beings. Thus human activity is highlighted by destruction
instead of creation, which is obviously counter-productive in terms of maintaining life in
general.
Now, to be sure, Freud’s psychoanalytic theory has come under heavy criticism
by other psychoanalysts, critical theorists (Habermas and his students) and post
structuralists. However, Douglas Kellner explains, Marcuse’s theory may still help us to
construct a strong theory o f subjectivity “without deploying the problematic aspects of
Freud’s instinct theory.”179 As such, we may realize humanity’s need for a life that is not
highlighted by overtime at the factory, and the annihilation of the Natural world
(including other human beings). Without getting caught up in the problematic aspects of
Freud’s theory, we need only to look around the world at the unfair and horrific
conditions in which people, animals and the environment are trapped. And though the act
of becoming aware o f social conditions takes much time for various reasons, those of us
lucky enough to develop a critical stance against social repression may create and spread
awareness about it.180

179 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 2001, p.86
180 Many individuals do not possess the necessary means to education, or the education to develop a critical
stance towards social repression. Others have no time to dedicated to it; we may imagine the single parent
with three kids, two jobs and not enough money to support the family. And yet others are simply too caught
up in the pop culture industry— which encourages individuals to strive for a life filled with consumption o f
mass produced commodities— these are the same individuals who identify and commit to the values o f
Capitalism: consumption, productivity, profit increase etc. Awareness may be raised by engaging with the
public and the community, through rallies, protests, public speaking and so forth.
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CONCLUSION:

In a sense, we should examine Marcuse as attempting to provide grounds for the
liberation of the individual through the liberation of sensuousness, and in turn, the
construction o f a subject who is able to critically examine the oppressive values of
capitalism. According to Kellner the central component of Marcuse’s theory, upon which
a theory of subjectivity may be built, lies in Marcuse’s claim “that the prevalent reality
principle o f Western civilization presupposes an antagonism between subject and object,
•

•

.

.

•

mind and body, reason and the passions and the individual and society.”

15?1

•

This

antagonism, between subject and object, causes the person to experience nature as an
object that has to be dominated and controlled. As such, in Western society, the ego is
conceived as an aggressive subject who struggles to gain complete control over nature,
including other human beings. This aggressive and oppressive character is the harnessed,
by channeling the powers of Eros towards socially productive activity that is dictated by
the performance principle. Finally, labor is used as a tool to dominate and transform
nature to fit the criteria of the established reality principle.182 This is synonymous with
Schiller’s conception of the “incomplete human beings”: Human existence is reduced to
an instrumental level, and as such, individuals become ‘specialized tools’ whose creative

181 Ibid, p.86
182 Ibid, p.86-87 The conception o f reason, under this reality principle, is an instrument o f domination
“that finds its culmination in the performance principle” (Kellner, p.87). The performance principle further
seeks to repress Eros (the life instinct) and all the instincts that demand pleasure and gratification. Kellner
quotes some o f Marcuse’s earlier work, addressing the values o f the performance principle, which include
“Profitable productivity, assertiveness, efficiency, competitiveness; in other words, the Performance
Principle, the rule o f functional rationality discriminating against emotions, a dual morality, the “work
ethic,” which means for the vast majority o f the population condemnation to alienated and inhuman labor,
and the will to power, the display o f strength, virility.” (Kellner quoting Marcuse)
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capacities and talents are neglected and sacrificed as a consequence of social and political
disorder.
Now, the answer to dealing with social repression and the liberation of the
individual may seem to center around aesthetic experience and aesthetic activity.
Aesthetic experience, for us, consists of de-sublimated erotic energy, and aesthetic
activity involves the channeling of the de-sublimated Eros into autonomous, creative and
imaginative activity. However, Marcuse contends, while both aesthetic experience and
aesthetic activity play a key role in the liberation of society—in that they allow human
beings to express the need for pleasurable and creative experience—they do not stimulate
social change on their own. Therefore, in the next chapter I will examine the ways in
which social repression is maintained through technology. I will primarily draw on
Marcuse’s work in One-Dimensional Man, and An Essay on Liberation. In particular, I
will consider Marcuse’s conception of true human needs and false human needs more in
detail, in order to get a better grasp of how technology is used as a tool of social
containment. And finally, I will consider the role and limits of aesthetics with relation to
social change.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE LOGIC OF DOMINATION AND SOCIAL CONTAINMENT

When I began my inquiry with Schiller I examined the split within the individual,
which manifests as a result o f the tensions between Nature and Reason. While Schiller
acknowledges the importance individual contribution to social development, through
specialized functions, he warns that individuals must not only be defined according to
those functions. The true meaning of “human individuals,” he believes, extends to their
abilities to freely and creatively determine themselves, and their social and political world
according to the laws o f the play-drive.183 Furthermore, Schiller explains that human
beings are essentially “multi-dimensional”, i.e. possess many talents and abilities that
require integral development, to focus on ‘one-dimension’ alone inevitably neglect the
‘whole’ development o f the individual.
However, Schiller’s theory lacks the social and political concepts needed to
concretize his points, which is why the second chapter is dedicated to fleshing out the link
between Schiller and Marcuse. Marcuse’s use of the concept of “play” lends much to his
theory on liberating individuals from social repression. Specifically, sensuous, erotic
energy that is repressed by the reality principle and channeled into the performance
principle becomes liberated through the play-drive. Thus we develop the notion of
“sensuous-reason” which allows us to understand and develop ourselves, and our world
according to the laws of the pleasure principle rather than the performance principle.
While Marcuse acknowledges the need for some degree of social repression, as
Schiller would agree, “surplus-repression” leads to the complete repression of the
183 The result o f the unification o f the sense drive and the form-drive.
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pleasure principle. And insofar as individuals value the demands o f the pleasure principle
“surplus-repression” represents an obstacle. Finally, though we may look to aesthetic
activity and play as ways that allow us to overcome the repressive aspects of the realityprinciple, we face a new kind of problem. Specifically, the character of the aesthetic has
now been absorbed by the reality principle. As a result aesthetic activity, and works of
art, that used to project different possibilities for human existence, loses its liberating
qualities.184
This chapter will serve to further concretize what has been said in the preceding
two chapters in two ways: first, by examining the social and political ramifications of
using technical reason as a tool to dominate the masses, thereby maintaining the cycle of
repression; second, by developing Marcuse’s point that aesthetics, as Schiller argued, on
its own does not suffice to liberate human beings

THE BEGINNING OF ONE DIMENSIONAL SOCIETY:

I will start with a short introduction before I get to the more technical aspects of
Marcuse’s theory, so that I may introduce some of the key ideas that I will discuss further
on. To begin, Marcuse applies the term “one-dimensional” to describe activity that
conforms to pre-established social norms, structures and behaviors. This is contrasted
with multi-dimensional activity “which focuses on possibilities that transcend the
established state o f affairs.” 185 Thus, multi-dimensional discourse aims at transcending

184 The liberating qualities o f the aesthetic are lost when they are commodified. I will discuss this in detail,
further in this chapter.
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the pre-established social norms and structures. An antagonism between subject and
object is presupposed, by their distinction, in which “the subject is free to perceive
1

o /

possibilities in the world that do not yet exist by which can be realized.”

Indeed,

Marcuse’s theory o f multi-dimensional discourse, presupposes the existence of an
autonomous, self-directing human being who is part of an “object-world” that contains
the material that allows us to develop the unrealized creative potential of humanity, and
cultivate the higher values of culture.187
The distinguishing feature of humanity for Marcuse is autonomous, creative
subjectivity. Individuals lose the ability to free determine the self the moment they are
indoctrinated into a system of pre-established, one-dimensional values. In the
introduction to the second edition of One-Dimensional Man Douglas Kellner says:
“alienated from the powers o f being-a self, one dimensional man thus becomes an object
of administration and conformity.”188 This is one of the main points that Marcuse wishes
to communicate to the reader: that one-dimensional society seeks to impose on its citizens
a pre-conceived, measurable and quantifiable concept of the self. Thus, when the
established capitalist order only provides individuals with superficial comforts, which
serve to maintain the pre-established concept of the self as a productive consumer, it also
discourages the possibilities for developing a sense of ‘self that opposes its values.
In the introduction to One Dimensional Man Kellner explains: “One dimensional
society and one dimensional man are the results of a long historical erosion of

185 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.xxvii
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid
188 Ibid, p. xxviii-xxix
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individuality which Marcuse criticized over several decades.”

1 8Q

This passage describes

Marcuse’s revolt against the loss of individuality in advanced industrial society. The only
way to get around one dimensional thought, it seems, is to encourage people’s ability to
critically about the existing social order. Being able to distinguish between existence and
essence, appearance and reality, allows us see how things are in reality and how we might
want them to be otherwise. One-dimensional thought, on the other hand, is unable to
make such a distinction between appearance and reality.190 One-dimensional individuals
lose their freedom since, for them, reality is identified with given appearances only.
Understanding reality simply in terms of what we may physically identify becomes one
dimensional when it is imposed on the population as the only mode of thought that
counts.
The parameters of existence, the boundaries that are pre-established by society,
become tighter and less accommodating for individual as well as social development
outside of the ruling order. And though there exists the possibility that the individual
might have all his or her needs and wants satisfied (indeed life is much more comfortable
now than it was say in Schiller’s time) the price that is paid for this satisfaction is the
surrender o f freedom.191 In this way, Marcuse’s work is best understood as the critical
analysis of “the logic of “the containment of social contradictions, forces of negation, and
possibilities o f liberation that exist but are suppressed.”192
Though much o f the advances in capitalism are celebrated as triumphs of
humanity, Marcuse perceives them as destructive acts with major global consequences.
189 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964(p. xxvviii)
190 Ibid,
191 Ibid, p. xxviii
192 Ibid, p. xxxiv
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The consequences of the destructive acts of the market—for the purpose of profit
increase—are pain and misery suffered by those who cannot participate in the economic
system.193 The planet itself suffers from the over-exploitative practices of capitalism, as
it wantonly depletes natural resources. Despite all its achievements, Marcuse believes,
capitalism has undermined and continues to undermine life. And though human life in
general, measured by population, continues to grow, quality of life is not improving for
everyone. Thus, the ideas of prosperity and growth in capitalism are based on “waste and
destruction, its progress fueled by exploitation and repression, while its freedom and
democracy are based on manipulation.”194
It will be central for us to understand exactly how concepts such as “freedom and
democracy” are used to manipulate the masses. Specifically, Marcuse will argue, the
manipulation occurs at the level of human needs. However, the individual does not know
what his or her “true needs” are, because the system imposes “false needs” on its citizens.
I will go on to discuss the issue of needs in more detail further on, but for now let us keep
in mind that by “true needs” Marcuse means: needs that are essential for the survival of
the individuals i.e. food, water, shelter, and ideally, freedom. And “False needs” refer to
commodities that are created by the system of production, for the purposes of maintaining
the cycle of repression.
However, true needs such as water and even air are also commodified, and by
Marcuse’s account, this means that they become false needs. But that is clearly not the
case since, commodified or not, water is still a necessary need for human beings. Since
193 Participation in the capitalist system o f production entails long hours o f labor and the consumption o f
mass-produced commodities. Individuals who do not possess the means (money) to secure the necessary
needs (food, water, clothes) for maintaining life are usually the ones who suffer the most
194 Ibid, p. xxx
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Marcuse’s conception seems too strict on the issue of true needs I suggest that we use
John McMurtry’s formula determining true needs, which tells us: N is a need i f and only
if, and to the extent that, deprivation o f N always leads to a reduction o f organic
capability.

Clearly, by McMurtry formula, the result of too much need deprivation,

whether the particular need is commodified or not, is death. However, McMurtry
continues, and Marcuse would agree, the market only recognizes the needs of the people
who have money to spend. This formula allows us to grasp a deeper understanding of true
needs, as Marcuse’s conception of “true needs” seems too harsh.195

SOCIAL CONTROL AND UNRIVALED COMFORTS:

“A Comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic un-freedom prevails in advanced
industrial civilization, a token of technical progress.”196

The critical ideas such as “freedom of thought, speech and conscience” lose their
critical dimension, as they are whittled down by the established social order. The negative
conception of freedom, Marcuse says, represents a different dimension of freedom that an
individual conceives when he or she criticizes the existing social order, is suppressed and
replaced by a functional conception of freedom that is imposed upon the individual by
pre-existing social norms. This functional conception of freedom, as we will see, amounts
to participation in the global free-market, through the programmed consumption of massproduced commodities, and ever increasing accumulation of capital.197 The problem, as

195 McMurtry, John. Unequal Freedoms: The global market as an ethical system. Garamond Press, Toronto,
Canada, 1998.
196 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.l
197In this context a “Junctional” conception o f freedom means that “freedom” is valuable only for the
specific function(s) or purpose it serves. As such, freedom is only considered as a means to an end, and not
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Marcuse will identify it, seems to have three features: first, the conception of freedom is
reduced to particular instances of consumer behavior. Second, people are indoctrinated to
accept this understanding as the only real and possible instantiation of the whole concept
of “Freedom.”

Finally the conception of greater possibilities o f freedom disappears

because freedom o f thought and action in ways that oppose the established order become
contained by that very same totalitarian system. These points will show themselves
explicitly through an analysis of Marcuse’s work in One-Dimensional Man and An Essay
On Liberation. I will now go on to discuss these three points in further detail.
To get a clear grasp of the first point let us consider the global market’s
conception of the individual a “free economic subject” (to use Marcuse’s term).198
Individuals are said to have the freedom to participate within the global market, to sell
and trade, to buy and own things, as long as they have the necessary means to do it, i.e.
money. From this follows the fact that those who do not possess the means to this
economic freedom cannot enjoy its comforts and rewards.199 As such, individuals are not
only forced to work, they are also forced to compete for work as each tries to prove their
economic worth. But according to Marcuse this is an impoverished conception of
freedom because the idea of “Freedom” is narrowed down consumer behavior. Marcuse
says,
If the individual were no longer compelled to prove himself on the
market, as a free economic subject, the disappearance of this kind
of freedom would be one of the greatest achievements of
civilization. The very structure of human existence would be
as an end in itself, which is how Marcuse will urge us to view it. In other words no one should have to pay
for freedom.
198 Ibid p.2
199 McMurtry, John. Unequal Freedoms: The global market as an ethical system. Garamond Press, Toronto,
Canada, 1998, p.159
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altered; the individual would be liberated from the work world’s
imposing on him alien needs and alien possibilities. The
individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would
be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and
directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs, its control
might well be centralized; such control would not prevent
individual autonomy, but render it possible.200

In some sense, some individuals may worry about “the loss of individual freedom”
insofar as it is ‘the loss of the freedom to participate in the free-market.’ But that is only
because of this impoverished one-dimensional conception of freedom, which reduces it to
the activity of buying and owning things. However, for Marcuse, individuals must realize
that the prevalent conception of freedom as “economic activity” must be negated, if they
are truly interested in preserving and developing “individual freedom.” It is only when
we criticize the established conception of human freedom— as the act of participating in
the free-market—that we may begin to conceive different possibilities and conceptions of
human freedom, such as independence from the economy, competition for vital resources,
and inhuman working conditions.201
The possibility to begin to develop this unrealized conception of freedom lies
within the technical apparatus itself. The prevailing system of technological rationality
may be reorganized so as to encourage the development of life in general, and in turn the
reduction of needless toil and suffering. However, the direct opposite occurs, as the
“technical apparatus imposes its economic and political requirements for defense and
expansion on labor time and free time, on the material and intellectual culture.”202

200 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964 p.2
201 Ibid, p.4
202 Ibid, p.2-3
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It is in this sense that the established social norms and values tend to be “totalitarian”:
they do not allow for any sort of opposition or possibility that may jeopardize their
existence. The development of such a one-dimensional system further tends towards
totalitarianism when it uses every facet of the media to perpetuate those norms and values
that ensure its survival. The media propagandizes for profit increase, and in this way
lends further support to maintaining the established order.
Upon closer investigation, Marcuse tells us, “This sort of well-being, the
productive superstructure over the unhappy base of society, permeates the “media” which
mediate between the masters and their dependents.”204

The mass media becomes

extremely efficient at disseminating the ruling, one-dimensional values of the established
social order. Through it the values of competition, profit increase, and the consumption of
commodities are imposed on people, telling them what to think and how to feel.205 But
something else is also at work, when the media imposes one-dimensional values it also
suppresses all other values (along with negative thinking). As such, the only language that
develops is that o f the established order.
Marcuse further reiterates the process of development towards a deeper
understanding o f the concept of freedom (and other concepts such as justice and
democracy) in his book An Essay on liberation. He says
What is at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the
question is no longer: how can the individual satisfy his own
needs without hurting others, but rather: how can he satisfy his
needs without hurting himself, without reproducing, through his
aspirations and satisfactions, his dependence on an exploitative

203 Ibid, p.3
204 Ibid, p. 85
205 Ibid.
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apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, perpetuates his
servitude?206
In this passage Marcuse is recalling the issue of true and false human needs, which he
brought up introduced above. It is important for Marcuse to consider the question of
human needs because it is precisely through the issue of “needs” that capitalism exerts
domination over Nature and humanity. Therefore, it is essential for us to return to the
issue of true and false human needs in order to grasp its full significance to my project.
Marcuse distinguishes between physical human needs, such as the vital needs that
are necessary to maintain the healthy function of the human organism—and socially
constructed needs that serve to perpetuate the established values of control and
domination. Keeping in mind that some socially constructed needs are true needs in the
sense described by McMurtry’s formula (such as the socially constructed need for certain
types of activities over others) we consider what Marcuse says in the following
paragraph:
We may distinguish both true and false needs. “False” are those
which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social
interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil,
aggressiveness, misery, and injustice. Their satisfaction might be
most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a
condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to
arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to
recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing
the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness.207
There are many criteria that fit into Marcuse’s conception of “false needs”, much of them
related to the consumption of mass-produced commodities by individual consumers. For

206 Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1969, p.4
207 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.4-5
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example, though all human beings share the necessary need to consume food, they do not
need to consume it in a commodified, fast-food form (as a happy-meal from McDonald,
or a value-meal from Wendy’s), such foods are false needs because they do not serve to
nourish the physical well-being o f the individual as much as they aim to increase profit
for the fast-food company.

Therefore, though the system of production provides us

with amazing comforts, the goal is to dominate and repress the human need for
freedom.209
On the other hand, “true needs”, for Marcuse, “the only needs that have an
unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones—nourishment, clothing, lodging at the
attainable level o f culture.”210 This is an important point to consider: though we may all
argue about whether or not one may need to own a computer, a car, or even eat candy, we
may not dispute the fact that we all need proper nourishment, clean air, education, and
shelter. These vital “true needs” must be satisfied first if we are to satisfy all other needs
“of the un-sublimated as well as the sublimated ones.”211 But we must also consider that
anyone that is indoctrinated into a one-dimensional, totalitarian system of beliefs cannot
give a truly thoughtful (critical), and considerate answer to the question of true and false
needs. The individual’s answer cannot be taken seriously precisely because it is not his or
her own, and only reflects the interests of the established social order.

208 Likewise, the need for the automobile is false, because a) we possess the ability to improve public
transit, and b) owning an automobile serves to further entrap the individual in the economic system
(through insurance payments, car tune-ups, gas and oil consumption etc.), in short the cost outweighs the
benefit. In this sense, the individual does not need to eat McDonald’s nor own a car to improve his or her
social existence.
209 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.5
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At this point the goal may seem clear: replacing false needs with true ones.
However, this is much easier said than done. As more new false needs are created and fed
into the cycle o f consumption, individual reliance on the system o f production rises.212
For Marcuse, radical social change, which involves the negation of the established norms,
values, and institutions of capitalism, is stalled because individuals are engaged in a
repetitive cycle o f consumption of false needs. A close look at An Essay On Liberation
reveals how individuals confuse false needs with true needs.
First, the rejection of the established order requires us to re-evaluate our
understanding of “true human needs.”

Marcuse refers to “true needs” as the

“infrastructure of man”, and that qualitative social change must begin at that level. “The
infrastructure of man” refers to Eros, the life instinct which seeks gratification first and
foremost. If the development, and understanding of true needs is directed by a rational,
eroticized subjectivity (as discussed in the previous chapter) then we may broaden our
conception o f freedom so that it is based on Erotic, instinctual demand for gratification.
Likewise, our understanding of “gratification of needs” is transformed. He says:
The new direction, the new institutions and relationships of
production, must express the ascent of needs and satisfaction very
different from and even antagonistic to those prevalent in the
exploitative societies. Such a change would constitute the

212 For example, wireless connections are available for those who feel constricted by wires when it comes
to computers and computer accessories. Though the overall idea o f “wireless technology”, which
incorporates electronic sensors that transmit and receive digital wave signals may improve our ability and
efficiency to communicate it still ends up solely for the purposes o f profit increase; “wireless freedom” as
such is available to those who can afford it, otherwise the person is constricted by wires (if the are fortunate
enough to be able to afford them). This example is meant to serve as an illustration o f the lack o f freedom
that is perpetuated by the system. The person is free from one commodity and simply relies upon another,
more advanced and intricate one. Then, it is only a matter o f the system o f production completely phasing
out one type o f commodity after enough dependence has been created over the new one. The same may be
said about other products that claim to increase individual freedom: faster, safer cars, better computers, and
high definition television sets.
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instinctual basis for freedom which the long history of class
society has blocked.213
Since human beings share a common interest when it comes to satisfying the need for
gratification, this new direction, Marcuse proposes, is common to all of them. And as
such, it is upon that commonality that individuals must develop the new understanding of
true human needs.
Furthermore, the above passage tells us, it is a mistake to equate the concept of
“human freedom” simply with the range of choice between commodities. The degree of
human freedom is more accurately determined by “what can be chosen and what is
chosen by the individual.”214 The choices, that are currently available to the individual,
surround the consumption of mass-produced commodities; it is not the sort of freedom
that Schiller foresaw. As we recall from Schiller, human freedom is expressed in the
activity of synthesizing form and matter, or play. Therefore, our understanding of true
human needs must include the rejection of the established, one-dimensional view of falseneeds.215
But if we recall the discussion of Freud in Chapter Two, the reality principle that
informs individual thought and action is the performance principle. Individuals learn to
identify pleasure and gratification with the demands of the performance principle and the
creative power o f Eros is channeled into socially productive activity i.e. work, consumer

213 Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1969, p.4
214 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.7
215 e.g. we need to eat nourishing food, because science has taught us the value o f a nutritious diet. We do
not need to eat mass-produced, commodified food in the same way, not just for health reasons but social
and environmental ones too (animal suffering, unfair working conditions, etc.)
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behavior.216 As such, individuals do not question the rules of the established order
because they do not perceive them as threats.217 Therefore, if we simply accept the
established understanding of human needs as “True” (mass-produced commodities), and
without question or criticism, we fall under the system’s repressive rule.
Now the market doctrine may profess to create equal opportunity for economic
competition for all peoples regardless of their race, sex, gender and other differences;
however, the point that all peoples share the false needs that maintain the system of
domination points to the deeper problem: the totalitarian and repressive character of the
established social order.218 We may now confront the rational character of the irrational
system of production, according to Marcuse: The comforts, benefits, and indulgences that
are now made available to us by the capitalist system of production make it difficult for
some to perceive precisely how it deters social progress through these comforts and
benefits. The reason for this blindness to the dangerous impact of the established order is
that individuals have adopted those destructive values of economic growth as their own.
He says
The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find
their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen
equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his
society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new
needs which it has produced.219

216 “Consumer behavior” in this context, refers to participating in the market: shopping, consuming
commodities.
217 Instead, individuals believe that abiding by the rules o f the reality principle leads to the fulfillment o f the
need for gratification.
218 Ibid, p.8
219 Ibidp.9
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This point is further developed in Essay on Liberation. Marcuse says that individuals
exercise their freedom and individuality through the commodities they purchase.220
Therefore, not only do individuals adopt the values of the market, but they also come to
identify their own existence with the commodities provided by the system of production.
The concept o f individuality is reduced to the commodity form, since now the person may
relate to him or herself, and to others through the mediation o f the commodities they own.
It is in this particular way that social control is perpetuated: the production and
consumption of socially constructed false needs.
Marcuse once again emphasizes the possibility for liberation that is embodied by
the same technical apparatus that dominates human beings. However, because of the
strong, dogmatic ties between individuals and the values of the market, any alternative to
those values seems irrational.

001

This false ideology, which the individual holds in

relation to the established system of production, serves to strengthen and perpetuate the
system o f domination, and social containment on a global scale. The result of this entire
process is:
a pattern o f one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas,
aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the
established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or
reduced to terms of this universe. They are redefined by the
rationality o f the given system and of its quantitative extension.222

220 Marcuse says “Self-determination, the autonomy o f the individual, asserts itself in the right to race his
automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his opinion, no
matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be. Organized capitalism has sublimated and turned to socially
productive use frustration and primary aggressiveness on an unprecedented scale— unprecedented not in
terms o f the quantity o f violence but rather in terms o f its capacity to produce long range contentment and
satisfaction, to reproduce the “voluntary servitude,”. Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Beacon
Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1969, p. 13
221 Ibid. Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964. p.9
222 Ibid p. 12
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As such, human beings may not develop a harmonious relationship between their
faculties, as the established reality principles forces them to adopt its one-dimensional
mode of thought. This will lead us into the second point, which concerns the
indoctrination o f the people, through the suffocation of critical thinking.

THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The way in which individuals are socialized to accept the established, one
dimensional reality extends, from the level of basic human needs up to the use of the
universal concepts required to evaluate social reality The concepts that are meant to serve
as exemplars or ideals, towards which human civilization may develop i.e., freedom,
democracy, justice etc. are reduced to the particular instances and behaviors required for
the realization of the advanced capitalist system.

'y'y'i

Marcuse relates this trend to

“operationalism” in the physical sciences, and “behaviorism” in the social sciences.

994

What is common to both cases is the way in which concepts are reduced to empirical,
measurable data that is used to quantify and represent “particular operations and
behavior.”225 In this way, the established social order finds a very useful way to convince
and reassure individuals that they are free and autonomous individuals. Any one who
doubts their freedom may simply look at a particular instance where someone is buying a
particular product that they choose. Thus, in this way, the concept of freedom is reduced

223 For example, freedom is measured by how much money the individuals possesses, democracy is
measured by the degree or level o f economic participation, and justice is measured by individual behavior
that adopts and conforms to the laws o f the free-market.

224Ibid.
225 Ibid.
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to the particular behavior that surrounds the activity of consuming mass-produced
commodities. Finally Marcuse explains, any concepts that cannot be reduced and
operationalized, i.e. reduced to measurable and quantifiable behaviors, are discarded.
The problem with the language of the established order, Marcuse explains, is that
it reduces concepts to the point that the difference between truth and appearance vanishes.
He says:
The concepts which comprehend the facts and thereby transcend
the facts are losing their authentic linguistic representation.
Without these mediations, language tends to express and promote
the immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and
established truth, essence and existence, the thing and its
function.226
The problem with operationalism becomes more specific, Marcuse says, since it confuses
the essence, or true meaning of concepts, with the words that are used to refer to them
(e.g. freedom as the ability to choose between different brands of commodities). This is
the highlight of scientific thought for Marcuse: formal logic which seeks to reduce
universal concepts to particular physical operations in the given reality “This is
technological reasoning, which tends “to identify things and their functions.”227 It is in
this way that concepts are thus “operationalized”, or reduced to particular instances of
individual behavior and empirical evidence through the use of language.
Furthermore, the result of operationalization of concepts is not simply this
confusion between “what is” and “what seems to be.”

There is also the issue of

dialectical discourse, which is closed off once again when a particular concept is

operationalized. That which distinguishes dialectical thinking from scientific thinking is

226 Ibid.
227 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.87
228 Ibid, p. 140
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precisely that dialectical thought: 1- contains within it a value judgment which rejects the
established reality, and 2- dialectical thought seeks to expand the meaning of concepts
rather than reducing them to particular instances and behaviors. In this sense, we may
understand Marcuse to be claiming that when concepts are operationalized the second
point of dialectical though is undermined.229

The reason why the established,

operationalized “concepts” (if we may still use that word) become resistant to change and
opposition, political reasoning becomes mere tautology. Marcuse says: “The analytic
structure insulates the governing noun from those of its contents which would invalidate
or at least disturb the accepted use of the noun in statements of policy and public opinion.
The ritualized concept is made immune against contradiction.”230 For example, when the
concepts o f democracy and individual freedom are reduced to particular social behavior.
As such it becomes difficult to deny or discredit the existing conception of freedom
because it has already been operationalized; it is already given a specific role that is
identified by a specific physical behavior, e.g. freely spending one’s money on
commodities.
The logic of operationalism becomes the logic guiding behavior when people
cease to criticize its validity, and simply accept its ways with no room for alternatives. As
such, individuals are also trained to discard concepts and ideals that cannot be
operationalized by market standards. Marcuse explains “The insistence on operational
and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior from the
given reality and fo r the suppressed alternatives.”

In this way reason is used to justify

229 Ibid, p.87 and also p.95
230 Ibid, p.88
231 Ibid, p. 16
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and perpetuate the use o f technology as an instrument of domination. Thus, the progress
of human civilization is measured by the criteria of the established social order. This logic
goes on unquestioned by those who identify it as the best possible ground for life in
general.
The problem with defining human progress solely in systemic terms leads to the
same problem faced when freedom is defined in the same way. The concept of human
progress is reduced to economic growth. However, if the system is reorganized so as to
meet the genuine needs of humanity, then technology may be used to the benefit of
humanity as it would “become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the
pacification of nature and society.”232 Now by “the pacification of nature and society”
Marcuse is referring to the possible resolution of the tensions that exist in the established
order of capitalism. Specifically, a “pacified existence” does not feature competition over,
and struggle for resources “where competing needs, desires, and aspirations are no longer
organized by vested interests in domination and scarcity—an organization which
perpetuates the destructive forms of this struggle.”

Mechanical, repetitive labor would

be relegated to machines and the working day may be reduced, so that individuals may
cultivate their humanity as an end in itself, as opposed to just a means of powering the
system o f production. Essentially, Marcuse is envisioning conditions that provide the
basis for Schiller’s conception of “the complete individual”, who is able to engage in
creative, autonomous activity i.e. “play.”
On the other hand, when we critically examine how capitalist societies function,
Marcuse says, we see a completely different picture. The ultimate end of technological
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rationality in the established social order is to serve as a tool o f domination for the

purposes of perpetuating market ideals.

>y 'i A

The result is a totalitarian, one-dimensional

system that undermines any opposition or criticism of its values and norms, since it stifles
both the norms and criteria according to which success in meeting them is measured. The
political character of technical reason is revealed in its application as a tool of social
containment.235 Therefore, the complete universe of discourse, the medium in which all
human relations may develop, is closed off to any opposition or change that seeks to
negate its existing values. The ability for people to think critically about the system of
production, or to develop the unrealized potential of both human beings and the machine
itself (the industry), is halted. That which is accepted by the public is a pre-established,
one-dimensional system o f values, consisting of labor, competition for resources, masscommodity consumption.
It is possible to understand the rule of the established order, and the perpetuation
of one-dimensional thought further, by examining Marcuse’s relationship to Marx. The In
order to justify his claim that any particular social class does not initiate a global
revolution, Marcuse begins by describing Marx’s position. The classical Marxist ideal,
which views the transition from capitalism to socialism as being rooted in the political
revolution of the proletariat, concludes that while the political apparatus of capitalism is
destroyed, the proletariat retains the “technological apparatus.” The workers overthrow

234 In Essay On Liberation Marcuse further emphasizes the degree to which individuals become blind to the
operations o f the system. He says “Self-determination, the autonomy o f the individual, asserts itself in the
right to race his automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his
opinion, no matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be. Organized capitalism has sublimated and
turned to socially productive use frustration and primary aggressiveness on an unprecedented scale—
unprecedented not in terms o f the quantity o f violence but rather in terms o f its capacity to produce long
range contentment and satisfaction, to reproduce the “voluntary servitude,” (Marcuse, p. 13)
235 Ibid, p. 18
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the government and gain control over industry as such. In such a case, Marcuse believes,
technology’s course is directed towards the development and sustainability of
humanity.236 However, the development of industrial society brought unprecedented
changes that Marx could simply not foresee.
The process of Mechanization, which reduces the need for human labor by
replacing it with machines, already distorts the Marxist conception of the proletariat. For
Marx, Marcuse explains, the proletariat was the primary source of labor whose abilities
where exploited to run the system of production.237 Though the physical demands placed
on the worker are reduced, it becomes replaced by mechanized, repetitive work that
increasingly alienates workers from one another. And while the workers may control the
machines that perform the demanding physical labor, the result still tends towards the
mass-production of commodities for the purposes of profit increase.238 Furthermore, in
the case of the modem worker as opposed to Marx’s proletarian, social change is
contained because the worker does not see anything to revolt against.239 The worker is
unable to see beyond the established conditions because he or she has already been
indoctrinated to accept the given notion of progress and freedom. Therefore, though
class-consciousness remains the same the consciousness of the worker has transformed
since Marx’s application o f the term.

236 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.22
237 Ibid.
238 The worker feels compensated with company benefits, recognition, and the presence o f worker unions
(meant to reflect and uphold the interests o f the workers). It is not as if the workers are really benefiting
from having control over the machine, since in the bigger picture they are considered only as mere units
that run the bigger capitalist machine.
239 Ibid, p.30 Marcuse points out the commitment o f the workers to the company that owns them, he says
“In some o f the technically most advanced establishments, the workers even show a vested interest in the
establishment— a frequently observed effect o f “workers’ participation” in capitalist enterprise.” (p.30) He
gives the example o f the company Caltex refineries.
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However, the conception of the worker is not the only one that changes. Whereas
at one point it was possible to point the finger at the capitalists and the owners of the
means of production, now it does not seem so clear. Marcuse writes
The capitalist bosses and owners are losing their identity as
responsible agents; they are assuming the function of bureaucrats
in a corporate machine. Within the vast hierarchy o f executive and
managerial boards extending far beyond the individual
establishment into the scientific laboratory and research institute,
the national government and national purpose, the tangible source
of exploitation disappears behind the fa9ade of objective
rationality.240

What this means is that the capitalist system of production now essentially runs itself. The
“owners” o f production and “bosses” must participate within the system, and much like
everyone else, they must obey the laws of the market because they have also been
indoctrinated to accept the value of profit increase. This is a result o f the intensification of
instrumental rationality, and we may recall Schiller who warns us about the danger of
being ruled by Reason alone.241 A change in the structure of labor is not necessarily
relevant to the development of humanity when the structure of society remains the same.
Marcuse reminds us, that individuals, whether they are employees, business owners, or
corporate bosses, all exist as instrumental resources not just for the perpetuation of the
system of domination, but also to perpetuate its values to their children as well as other
people.
Marcuse refers to the dialectical relationship between the Master and Slave, which
comes out o f Hegel, and concretized through Marx, to describe how obsolete it has
become. While in Marx’s time the system of production was organized as a clear relation
240 Ibid, p.34
241 refer to the discussion o f Schiller in Chapter 1
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between Masters (capitalist owners) and slaves (workers), this distinction disappears in a
modem, capitalist society. In a very loose summation of the story: The existence of the
owners depended on the existence of workers, and if the workers revolted against the
owners they would be able to gain control over the system of production (not control over
other people).242 But this is not the case in modem industrial society; whether or not the
workers overthrow the bosses, they still remain subservient to the machine process of
capitalism. Marcuse writes
The organizers and administrators themselves become
increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and
administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the
dialectical relationship between Master and Servant, which has
been broken in the struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a
vicious circle which encloses both the Master and the Servant.243

In modem capitalism this difference disappears since both Master and Servant serve a
greater process, namely technological rationality.
Therefore, the logic of social containment undermines the meaning of universal
concepts by reducing them to measurable values. The understanding of a particular
concept in economic terms is disseminated as a value o f the ruling established order, and
basically serves to deepen the roots of the reality principle, and increase surplus
repression.244 Individuals are not able to think outside o f the established system of
values, and as such they simply adopt the given norms that are imposed upon them from
without. In this way social containment creates a one-dimensional, totalitarian society,
where social change and progress is measured strictly in economic terms, and the

242 A much more detailed discussion o f the “Master and Slave dialectic” is provided by Marx in The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o f 1844
243 Ibid, p.33
244 As discussed in chapter two.
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prospect of social change seems more and more dire as the elements that are necessary for
its development are stripped away by the existing order.

THF DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINMENT:

Here we have the political concretization of Schiller’s claims, that individuals
must possess the necessary resources that are required for an aesthetic education. But
Schiller is unable to articulate the social and political conditions that deny the aesthetic
development of individuals. And though it is true, Marcuse believes, that the entire goal
of technological rationality can be transformed so that the system o f production serves to
satisfy human ends instead of economic ends, society must possess the necessary
resources required for such a transformation. Most importantly, freedom is an
achievement that we must first develop in order to guide social development, and not by
technological rationality. Individuals must have free and equal access to the resources that
enable them to maintain their physical and mental well being, so that they may then
establish and develop the laws of a free society. Marcuse says,
Indeed, society must first create the material prerequisites of
freedom for all its members before it can be a free society; it must
first create the wealth before being able to distribute it according
to the freely developing needs of the individual; it must first
enable its slaves to learn and see and think before they know what
is going on and what they themselves can do to change it.245

In a truly free society, not only do individuals have free and equal access to the necessary
resources for personal and social development, they are also encouraged to continually

245 Ibid, p.40
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redefine the established order. The result is a gradual social change, in which the
individuals control the means of production, as well their own lives.
However, under the capitalist system of production “social change” is always
imposed upon individuals from the outside. In the case of modem capitalist society, social
change always involves a relation to the economy. Marcuse says
The growing productivity of labor creates an increasing surplusproduct which, whether privately or centrally appropriated and
distributed, allows an increased consumption—notwithstanding
the increased diversion of productivity. As long as this
constellation prevails, it reduces the use-value of freedom; there is
no reason to insist on self-determination if the administered life is
the comfortable and even the “good” life. This is the rational and
material ground for the unification of opposites, for one
dimensional political behavior.246

As such, “social change” in capitalism refers to economic trends and the people’s
response to them. New trends in consumption, such as shopping for particular products at
a certain store (in the physical world or through the Internet, entertainment, global news,
and the overall dissemination of capitalist values, are imposed to the public through mass
media. Those who identify their existence with the ruling market values (to consume and
increase profit) behave according to what is given to them. As such, real social change,
which would involve the negation of the existing order, cannot take place in a one
dimensional society.
The question now becomes: How is it that technological rationality maintains its
hold on the development o f “negative thinking”? In chapter three of One-Dimensional
Man The Conquest o f the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation, Marcuse
wants to consider the ways in which technological rationality destroys “the oppositional

246 Ibid, p.49
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and transcending elements in “higher culture.”247 Marcuse notes what he refers to as
“two antagonistic spheres of society” that have existed together throughout the
development of human civilization: Higher culture (the unrealized potential of humanity),
and Reality (the established social order). The elements of “higher culture”, which I will
go on to discuss further, such as philosophy and art are simply absorbed, he tells us, by
the “process o f desublimation. ” Thus, the energy that should be directed towards the
intellectual and cultural development of a society is instead absorbed by “reality” (the
pre-established social order) and directed towards the production and consumption of
commodities, and the maintenance of established values and norms. This denial of the
need to grow is rooted in the destruction of the opposite (such as the values of higher
culture). If there are no opposing values that may entice individuals to leave their present
state of affairs, then there can be no resistance to the established social order.248
The problem with the concept of “higher culture”, Marcuse says, is that much like
other universals it is reduced to particular instances, where it loses “the greater part of its
truth.”249 The western values of higher culture are pre-technological both in a functional
as well as a chronological sense. Higher culture, Marcuse explains, “was derived from the
experience o f a world which no longer exists and which cannot be recaptured because it is
in a strict sense invalidated by technological society.”250 Furthermore, higher culture is a

247 Ibid, p.56
248 If all “alien rationality” bends to the will and rationality o f the status quo, and individuals are further
discouraged from even conceiving, let alone developing, values and norms that differ from those o f the
status quo. he possibilities for developing social values and norms that oppose the status quo are slim,
because the established social order simply does not provide the resources for the development o f such
values.
249 Ibid, p.58
250 Ibid.
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feudal culture in so far as it is: 1-restricted to a privileged minority, 2-its “authentic
i

works” remained detached from the realms of business and industry.
The second point deserves some careful consideration. Marcuse has high regards
for the bourgeois mentality, which sought expression in the different forms of higher
culture, specifically art and literature. The bourgeois class, through literature and art, was
able to express a dimension of human thought and feeling that was “irreconcilably
antagonistic to the order of business, indicting it and denying it.”

Schiller is a key

exemplar of this because he represents the ideal bourgeois character who seeks to
overcome the established perception of reality through art.253 Moreover, this “other”
dimension expressed the people’s rejection of the established order, through the portrayal
of images that would disrupt the status quo and:
not by the religious, spiritual, moral heroes (who often sustain the
established order) but rather by such disruptive characters as the
artist, the prostitute, the adulteress, the great criminal and outcast,
the warrior, the rebel-poet, the devil, the fool—those who don’t
earn a living, at least not in an orderly and normal way.254
However, Marcuse continues, though these images are still used throughout literature and
art today, they do not serve the same purpose that they once did: to negate the established
order. Rather, they merely affirm the values of the established order because they become
absorbed into it as resources to be commodified and sold to the public.
This sort of destructive and repressive social activity becomes the exact opposite
of sublimated social activity. Sublimation is necessarily creative because it possesses

251 Ibid.
252 Ibid
253 Schiller Letter on The Aesthetic Education o f Man were about the only philosophical text he has ever
written. He later left his interest in philosophy and pursued his passion for art, play writing to be exact.
254 Ibid, p.59
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within it a principle o f unification and harmony, which is the purpose of Eros as we recall
from chapter two. I shall now discuss the outcome of “repressive desublimation” in
relation to the critical and negating powers of the aesthetic.

THE FATE OF THE ARTS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE CHARACTER OF
CULTURE: THE RISE OF THE HAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

Marcuse uses the terms “artistic alienation” to denote the world that the artist
creates by virtue o f dissociating him or herself from the established order. Marcuse is not
using the term “alienation” to describe the relationship between individuals and
individual labor in capitalist society. Rather, Marcuse says “the artistic alienation is the
conscious transcendence o f the alienated existence— a “higher level” or mediated
alienation.”

This mediated alienation was the function of art and literature before they

were commodified and absorbed by the established capitalist order, Marcuse says, “The
place of the work o f art in a pre-technological and two-dimensional culture is very
different from that in a one-dimensional civilization.”256 In pre-technological and twodimensional culture, he explains, art holds the concept of negation within it “it is the
Great Refusal—to protest against that which is. The modes in which man and things are
made to appear, to sing and sound and speak, are modes of refuting, breaking, and

255 Ibid, p. 60
256 Ibid, p.63
This also represents a limit to Schiller’s argument, because there is no way he could have had any
understanding o f “technological culture” in the way Marcuse describes it. And as such, Schiller is not able
to distinguish between pre-tech and modem technological culture. He simply cannot use his era as a
reference point to something that has not come into existence. Marcuse, however, is able to critically
examine the historical development o f technological culture dating back to Schiller’s time.
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recreating their factual existence.”257 Therefore, Marcuse says, “Artistic alienation”, is
sublimation—the channeling of the erotic energy into creative endeavor—it aims at
creating images that do not fit in accordance with the established values of the social
order. However, he continues, once this feature of art is commodified it becomes de
sublimated, and loses it negative, critical content.258
We may understand the relevance and importance of the critical dimension of art,
by recalling our conception of Eros as discussed previously. Stephen Eric Bronner
elaborates on this particular point. He tells us that for Marcuse as for Schiller, art allows
us to creatively channel the liberating powers of Eros to express our humanity as a unified
whole. Whereas repression is imposed through various social institutions, the individual
attempts to “vent his libidinal energy through a sublimated practice that will result in a
work of art.” However, as Marcuse will show us, this attempt, to oppose the repressive
and oppressive values of the given system is undermined because the system of
productivity will soak up “the erotic, libidinous content which provides the aesthetic
object with its emancipatory “truth”. As a consequence, repression will literally increase
through society’s subversion of sublimated activity.”259 Therefore, within the confines of

257 ibid
258 Ibid, p.71
259 Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988, p .l 11
The exact quote by Bronner is : “Where repression is brought to bear upon the individual through
institutionalized controls, he will attempt to vent his libidinal energy through a sublimated practice that will
result in a work o f art. But, the very society which the artwork attempts to oppose will transform that
oeuvre and “absorb” the erotic, libidinous content which provides the aesthetic object with its emancipatory
“truth”. As a consequence, repression will literally increase through society’s subversion o f sublimated
activity”.
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one-dimensional culture art loses this feature of negation as it is integrated into the modes
of domination.
A brief look at Marcuse’s earlier work will allow us to further comprehend his
position. Specifically, we will be able to understand how Marcuse’s latest work brought
Marcuse back to some of his earliest work.

Morton Schoolman explains Marcuse’s

understanding o f the relationship between the artist and his or her society.261 Marcuse
had argued that the artist has two fundamental relationships with society: 1- as an
extension of the norms and values of society, and 2- as a critical force whose work
inherently negates the existing norms and values of society. Both kinds of relationships
depend on the social order in which the artist lives. I will briefly describe both, focusing
on the second relationship since it is central for Marcuse.
The first relationship concerns artists who live in a homogenous society where the
economic, cultural and political spheres are all bound together by a single set of norms.
Artists who live in a homogenous society are an extension of that homogeneity, and feel
the need to represent that spiritual unity through works of a rt262
The second relationship that the artist has can be seen in modem society. Modem
society, Schoolman explains, is divided. This breakdown of the once homogenous society
“occurs with the development of classes, the division of society into new social strata,
professions, and so forth, and with the cultural complexity that follows in the path of this

260 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. “The Aesthetic
Dimension and the Second Dimension (p. 324-349) The Free Press, a division o f Collier Macmillan Co.,
Inc. New York, 1980, p.326
2611 am referring to Morton Schoolman’s book The Imaginary Witness, where he discusses Marcuse’s
doctoral dissertation “The German Artist Novel"
262 Ibid, p.327Schoolman explains: “Consequently, the life o f an entire society is uniformly expressed
through a common spiritual ethos.” (p.327)

106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

development.”263 The ramifications of this social breakdown extend throughout human
culture, and as such, the artist’s relationship with society mirrors that division. The artist
becomes separated from the social order, and art no longer mirrors the unity of society.
Art is no longer the extension of the consciousness of the whole, since the whole has
become fragmented. This second relationship between the artist and society is the one
that Marcuse develops in more detail throughout One-Dimensional Man.
The result o f this fragmentation in society is an opposition between art and social
existence. The artist, Schoolman explains, is forced to realize that there is no universal
social spirit. Furthermore, this realization then drives the artist to define him/herself as a
subject, who is facing the divided and antagonistic parts of society. Schoolman explains,
“As society’s various aspects become objects of the artist’s work, nothing in the society
satisfies the artist’s need to portray a unified vision of social life. Art can only reproduce
the fragmentation o f culture.”264 A work of art then reflects this separation of the artist
from society. Once the artist is aware that the work of art expresses the alienation with
society he “passes beyond a self-consciousness of his opposition to society. He attempts
to reunify art and life by depicting a higher, more rational ideal of a unified spiritual
existence through a new aesthetic form.”265 On the one hand, in a homogenous, one
dimensional society, a work of art is in conformity with the established norms; it mirrors
the whole social cohesion. On the other hand, in an antagonistic society, or “multi
dimensional society” to use Marcuse’s term, works of art do not reflect any cohesive

263 Ibid, p.326
264 This is another limitation that Schiller could not have considered, and Marcuse is forced to correct.
Schiller could not foresee the impact o f the commodification o f art. Therefore, he cannot comprehend how
the critical character o f art could be suppressed and destroyed once it has been absorbed by the commodity
form.
265 Ibid, p.328
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social norms, and are instead separate and opposed to dominant ideologies. This is
precisely the dialectical process which allows the elements of “higher culture” to
“develop the progressive dimensions of the antagonisms without becoming divided
internally.”266
In one o f Marcuse’s earlier essays called “The Affirmative Character of Culture”,
he explains that the affirmative character of culture includes the dimensions of the
intellectual and spiritual world, such as art, philosophy, and religion that are believed to
be more important than tasks which directly involve earning a living. However,
Schoolman explains, human culture does generate many ideals that express hopes,
desires, and higher possibilities of life which causes the intellectual/spiritual world to be
at odds with the world of necessary labor.267 However, Schoolman continues, art is
different from religion and philosophy for the following reasons: first, religion sacrifices
human happiness “in the here and now” reserving it for an afterlife “thus fostering
worldly stoicism.”

'J f.Q

Second, for Marcuse, even philosophy has abandoned its search for

an ideal of happiness. For Marcuse, only Marxist philosophy seriously considers the
concept of human happiness, and struggles to bring that ideal to humanity.269 Therefore,
for Marcuse, the critical function of art resides in its opposition to established norms of
the given society.

266 Ibid.
267 Ibid, p.329
Schoolman writes “The cultural universe is decidedly optimistic in that it expresses the ideas o f beauty,
pleasure, harmony, virtue, forgiveness and love, truth and justice. Culture protects notions o f happiness as
attainable ideals. In so doing, the real o f culture assumes critical qualities. B y sustaining the idea o f a better
life, it implicitly indicts society for its lassitude in fulfilling the promises o f affirmative culture.”
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
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However, Marcuse’s point is that the individual’s attempt to create an artwork that
challenges the status quo is both undermined and exploited along with the artwork itself.
The artwork is assimilated and commodified and the cry for change is silenced' Shierry
Weber describes this phenomenon as “The Perversion of the Aesthetic.”270

This

perversion results when the emancipatory potential of Eros is channeled into the market
and diffused as commodities. As a commodity the emancipatory value of an artwork is
replaced by economic value: for example, rock music, which has opposes the status quo
with unconventional rhythm and unusually loud noise levels serve to diffuse repressed
sexual and aggressive energy, thus substituting annihilation and explosion - escape from
the self - for discovery and integration.”

As such as the emancipatory potential of Eros

is exploited, and the existing reality principle is strengthened: In this sense, the
exploitation of Eros feeds and reinforces the status quo. This brings us full circle back to
the process of “repressive desublimation” as described by Marcuse: when the
emancipatory potential of Eros (Sublimated activity) is channeled into socially acceptable
forms such as work, or consuming commodities and participating in the free market.
Finally, those socially acceptable forms, on which the energy of Eros is focused, are

270 Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988, p. 111
Bronner Quotes Weber, who says “The perversion o f the aesthetic: whereas the aesthetic is a totality
formed by sublimation o f the instincts, the spectacle releases instinctual energies but does not bind them
into forms. On the other hand, the spectacle as aesthetic and as consumption prevents the individual from
experiencing action and process; he is an actor only as an object and a subject only as a spectator; he
consumes rather than makes.”
27’Shierry M, Weber, “Individuation as Praxis,” in Critical Interruptions, ed. Paul Breines, New York:
Herder and Herder, 1970, p.37
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ultimately repressive since they do not allow for the free manifestation of sublimated
activity.272
As the system increases the availability of commodified comforts the critical
dimension o f the mind dwindles and with it the hope for social change. Individuals no
longer engage in the dialectical movement that allows them to overcome oppressive
values. Instead, many o f them bask in the comforts provided to them by the system of
production, satisfied and completely oblivious to their servitude to the system. Therefore,
the established social order which denies and discourages the growth of any opposing
values by suppressing the ability and desire to think critically i.e., engage in negative
thinking and, as Marcuse says “The Happy Consciousness comes to prevail.”
The “Happy Consciousness” is basically created by the culture industry in order to
make people complacent to the point where they simply accept the given reality principle.
The happy consciousness, he says:
reflects the belief that the real is rational, and that the established
system, in spite of everything, delivers the goods. The people are
led to find in the productive apparatus the effective agents of
thought and action to which their personal thought and action can
and must be surrendered. And in this transfer, the apparatus also
assumes the role of a moral agent. Conscience is absolved by
reification, by the general necessity o f things.274
Furthermore, not only does the happy consciousness accept the existing reality principle,
it also lacks the necessary tools and conditions to oppose it, and as such has no interest in

272 Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988, p.l 11
273Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.79
274 Ibid
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seeking the creation of a better society.275 This lack of interest towards negating the
established system o f production reflects the fact that most individuals have been
suppressed to accept its existence as necessary and a given. Any opposition to the
established order is quickly absorbed into a commodity form, thus canceling its critical
potential.276 Works o f art, Bronner explains, used to point the way towards a more
utopian world but has now been assimilated into the mainstream of society. Art ceases to
be a unique expression o f human freedom and creative since it becomes commodified. As
such, works of art are reduced to things that everyone can understand: a nice painting on a

275 The lack o f resources and materials, and the necessary conditions for the fostering o f negative thought
and opposition, is not due to their scarcity. Rather there is a lack o f access to those resources and materials,
they belong only to those who can afford to buy them at market-price.
27<5Bronner, Stephen Eric. “Between Art and Utopia: Reconsidering the Aesthetic Theory o f Herbert
Marcuse.” Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise o f Utopia. Eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg,
Charles P. Weble and Contributors. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1988, p.l 15
Bronner further elaborates on the consequences o f the happy consciousness. He says
“The result is a “non-conformist conformity” (Adomo) whose conditions emerge from the affluence o f
advanced industrial society. In Marcuse’s view, poverty and misery are no longer visible in daily life for the
majority o f the population. Through the creation, satisfaction, and re-creation o f false needs, individuals
will be content to enjoy their existence in accordance with those values which are propagated by the status
quo. Satisfied, complacent, and introjected with the “happy consciousness,” the individuals o f advanced
industrial society have become ideologically incapable o f valuing even the possibility o f a different
enjoyment, peace, or a more embracing and sustained gratification”
277 Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1964, p.65
Marcuse makes a sarcastic comment about commodified or “kitsch” art, and those who might praise it as a
critical element o f higher culture. He says:
“It is good that almost everyone can now have the fine arts at his fingertips, by just turning a knob on his
set, or by just stepping into his drugstore. In this diffusion, however, they become cogs in a culture-machine
which remakes their content.”
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CONCLUSION:

I have attempted to discuss the main ways of technological domination and
oppression as expressed by Marcuse in One-dimensional Man, and to a small extent his
work in An Essay on Liberation. The logic of domination, as Marcuse explains it, has
been transformed since Marx’s time to a point that it easily resists any radical, social
revolution. The social class that would serve as the basis for a revolution in Marx’s time
has been pacified by the comforts that are provided to them by the established capitalist
system of production. Furthermore, this pacification of human thought results in what
Marcuse calls “One-dimensional Society”, a society whose totalitarian values and norms
are imposed upon its citizens, forcing them to act and behave according to those one
dimensional rules. One-dimensional thought, which entails mental atrophy and social
aggression (competition over resources thought to be scarce i.e., false needs), serves to
completely stall true human progress.278 Any opposition to the laws and values of the
market is met with fierce resistance by those who hold the established values as their
own: Moreover, the necessary conditions for the development of negative thought,
including the necessary material and intellectual resources, are completely repressed,
making it more difficult for individuals to begin any serious movements.279

278 “True human progress” in this sense is defined as the unfolding o f the dialectical process that aims at
forming more considerate and understanding relationships with life and the world in general. For example,
true human progressed may be measured by how well a given society is able to satisfy everyone’s basic
needs, without having them engage in economic competition. Instead, the laws o f the market define
progress in economic terms i.e., the ability for a society, to sustain itself through the accumulation o f
capital.
279 Though individuals may still form organizations that hold values which oppose the market doctrine, they
encounter much difficulty and opposition from those who cling to the established values o f the market.
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Furthermore, insofar as art is commodified it loses its emancipatory qualities,
since it becomes absorbed into the capitalist system of production and reduced to an
economic calculation. But we may still think of instances where different public
institutions promote culture and art e.g. public museums and art galleries. Also
educational institutions may offer course in art and music as part o f their curriculum.
While this type of aesthetic education is still limited by the curriculum of educational and
other public institutions the point is that the public should be exposed to art in its non
commodified form because: the liberating power of the aesthetic lies in its expression as a
free, and creative activity.
The final question, which I will leave for the concluding chapter four, is thus:
what sort o f optimism can we count on from Marcuse’s point of view? His book An
Essay on Liberation reiterates the central themes in One-Dimensional Man. though he
seems to hold a more positive view for the use and application of art. But one of the most
central points he makes concerns what he calls “a biological foundation for socialism”,
which requires us to address our understanding of human needs. Once we address the
question of human needs, Marcuse will argue, we may then be able to develop the
necessary political foundations that will ensure their satisfaction.
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CHAPTER 4:
A DIFFERENT DIRECTION

In One-Dimensional Man Marcuse paints a grim picture for the aesthetic realm in
general: its critical powers are absorbed and transformed into commodities. As such, the
content of a work o f art can no longer represent the negation o f the established norms and
values, once they become mass-produced commodities. However, his latest work in An
Essay On Liberation and The Aesthetic Dimension . Marcuse brings us back to the point
from which we originally began: Aesthetics as an ideal towards which we aim, to project
and represent better possibilities of human existence.280 In this concluding chapter, I will
discuss Marcuse’s later views about aesthetics, in order to link him back to Schiller and
the concept of the beautiful (living-shape). Specifically, Marcuse seems to call for the
development o f a rational subjectivity that is guided by Eros.281
To do this, I will begin by examining the section in An Essay On Liberation: A
Biological Foundation fo r Socialism? to understand Marcuse’s optimism about the
liberating powers of the aesthetic. I do not believe that Marcuse intended to leave us with
an apocalyptic portrayal o f the future of human civilization (and his two last books are
proof o f that). Rather, his point, as I intend to show, is to ground radical social change in
something that is more basic to humans than aesthetics, and more common to all human
beings. Next I will examine key passages in The Aesthetic Dimension and the section on

280 In fact, on page one o f The Aesthetic Dimension Marcuse says “It seems that art as art expresses a truth,
an experience, a necessity which, although not in the domain o f radical praxis, are nevertheless essential
components o f revolution.”, and as such represents an ideal for human beings.
281 “Eros” as discussed in chapter 2, and as Marcuse discusses it in Eros and Civilization.
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The New Sensibility in An Essay On Liberation, where Marcuse discusses the liberating
potential o f aesthetics, and make the necessary connections to the preceding chapters.

THE BIOLOGICAL DEMAND FOR LIFE:

In the section A Biological Foundation fo r Socialism, of his book An Essay On
Liberation. Marcuse tells us that the possibility for the realization of a utopian human life
is inherent in the technological advancements that we have created. Marcuse tells us that
we possess the necessary material and intellectual resources that are required to liberate
humanity from the oppressive aspects of western capitalism. But, as we have seen in
chapter two, it is not enough that individuals access the necessary resources, and control
the economy. The problem of true and false needs must be solved.282 False needs
perpetuate the oppression of the people, and as such, the change must begin at the level of
basic human needs. A change in those needs would bring about what Marcuse calls the
new instinctual basis for freedom.
What we must chiefly keep in mind is that, for Marcuse, the question of needs
must take precedence prior to any discussion of ethics or morals that pertain to human
existence. Freud tells us that the demand for instinctual gratification takes precedence
over everything else.283 And Marcuse picks up on this point again in a very important
passage. He says:
Prior to all ethical behavior in accordance with specific social
standards, prior to all ideological expression, morality is a
“disposition” of the organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive to
282 The distinction between false and true needs is discussed in the previous chapter, and that is the one I
will be referring to from here on.
283 Refer back to chapter two.
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counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve “ever greater
unities” o f life. We would then have, this side of all “values,” an
instinctual foundation for solidarity among human beings— a
solidarity which has been effectively repressed in line with the
requirements of class society but which now appears as a
precondition for liberation.284

This central passage tells us that all human beings seem to share a common connection
upon which we may build our conceptions of ethics and morality. Specifically, all human
beings share the biological need to seek instinctual gratification. Furthermore, Marcuse is
echoing another point he makes in Eros and Civilization, namely the biological demand
by the organism, the instinctual demand of Eros, to “create and preserve “ever greater
unities” of life.”285 And it is specifically at this stage that we must consider the question
of needs.
The new needs, he says, must be inherently antagonistic to the established
conception of “needs” (false-needs). The problem, as I discussed in Chapter Three, is that
individuals come to identify their false needs as true needs. And the difference between
true and false needs is that the former serve to maintain human life, while the latter serve
to maintain the established order. As such, people adopt the value of consumer society as
necessary for maintaining life, when in fact it only fosters dependence and perpetuates

284 Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1969, p. 10
285 Ibid. recall the discussion o f Eros and Civilization in chapter 2.
Marcuse describes his use o f the term “biological” in a very important footnote to this passage. He says:
“I use the terms “biological” and “biology” not in the sense o f the scientific discipline, but in order to
designate the process and the dimension in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and aspirations become
vital needs which, if not satisfied, would cause dysfunction o f the organism. Conversely, socially induced
needs and aspirations may result in a more pleasurable organic behavior. If biological needs are defined as
those which must be satisfied and for which no adequate substitute can be provided, certain cultural needs
can “sink down” into the biology o f man. We could then speak, for example, o f the biological need o f
freedom, or o f some aesthetic needs as having taken root in the organic structure o f man, in his “nature,” or
rather “second nature.” This usage o f the term “biological” does not imply or assume anything as to the way
in which needs are physiologically expressed and transmitted.”
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domination. Moreover, individuals cannot understand that they are trapped in a cycle o f
consumption, and thus un-free, because their understanding of human freedom is defined
by that very system within a closed circle of prejudgment, as the act of participating in
ffee-market economics.286 In this way, individuals feel that they gain a sense of freedom
by participating in the market. But this is only a superficial and one-dimensional sense of
freedom that is reduced to particular instances of consumer behavior.
However, as individuals adopt the values and norms of the market they continue
restrict their understanding o f the concept of freedom to the one-dimensional view of the
established order. And yet, this is precisely the tinning point, for Marcuse, upon which
the basis for a revolution may be built:
We would have to conclude that liberation would mean
subversion against the will and against the prevailing interests of
the great majority of the people. In this false identification of
social and individual needs, in this deep-rooted, “organic”
adaptation of the people to a terrible but profitably functioning
society, lie the limits of democratic persuasion and evolution. On
the overcoming of these limits depends the establishment of
democracy.
At this point, for Marcuse, once individuals adopt and internalize the values and norms of
the established social order it becomes difficult to reject them, without also, in a sense,
rejecting oneself. This character is embodied in Marcuse’s conception of “The New
Sensibility.”
Marcuse’s discussion of the “new sensibility” involves the conception of a
changing, developing and evolving subjectivity that strives towards higher states of

286

Ibid, p. 12-13
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freedom and happiness.287 According to this view, subjectivity is not fixed, and neither
are the states o f freedom and happiness. This conception of is of a subjectivity that
struggles against, and refuses oppression and domination in favor of a better quality of
life. Instead, according to Marcuse, the reality principle would evolve, and its values and
norms would develop to match the development and evolution of individuals.
Specifically, Douglas Kellner explains, the new sensibility “would be developed,
Marcuse claimed, by an aesthetic education that would cultivate imagination, fantasy, the
senses and reason, producing a “new rationality” in which reason would be bodily, erotic,
and political.”288
Marcuse returns to Schiller’s conception of aesthetic education and play, arguing
that in aesthetic and erotic experience, play, and fantasy, the conflict between reason and

287 Marcuse’s interest in the wom en’s liberation movement was spurred for precisely the same reason that
he was attracted to the N ew Left. The women’s movement, perhaps far more than the New Left, was the
living expression o f the new sensibility. Women’s liberation would be human liberation because the social
order that would adhere to feminist principles would also adhere to a new reality principle. Feminine
characteristics are those o f Eros and, as such, correspond to the truest potentialities for a socialist society.
For Marcuse, “feminist socialism” represented the antithesis o f the performance principle, the emancipation
o f the senses and the intellect from the rationality o f domination, “creative receptivity versus repressive
productivity.” Feminist socialism would release the female element, libido, as a power in the rebuilding of
all social institutions. Before the feminist movement could move to this higher stage o f emancipatory
politics, however, the equality o f women was the first objective and the absolute prerequisite for liberation.
“Only as an equal economic and political subject,” Marcuse declared, “can the woman claim a leading role
in the radical reconstruction o f society.” Here, once again, Marcuse remains within the theoretical
framework o f a radical critique o f society while proposing liberal political practice as a means eventually to
secure the influence required for organizing on an expanded scale. Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary
Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc.
New York, 1980, p. 325-326
288 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
P apers o f H erbert M arcuse. London: Routledge, 2001, p.91

Kellner says: “Instead o f the need for repressive performance and competition, the new sensibility posits
the need for meaningful work, gratification, and community; instead o f the need for aggression and
destructive productivity, it affirms love and the preservation o f the environment; and against the demands
o f industrialization, it asserts the need for beauty, sensuousness, and play, affirming the aesthetic and erotic
components o f experience.”
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the senses would be overcome so that “reason is sensuous and sensuousness rational”.

Marcuse says:
The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a
science and technology free to discover and realize the
possibilities o f things and men in the protection and the
gratification o f life, playing with the potentialities o f form and
matter for the attainment of this goal. Technique would then tend
to become art, and art would tend to form reality: the opposition
between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties,
poetic and scientific though, would be invalidated. Emergence of
a new Reality Principle: under which a new sensibility and a
desublimated scientific intelligence would combine in the creation
of an aesthetic ethos.289
This is a central link back to Schiller: Operating through the play impulse, the aesthetic
function would “abolish compulsion, and place man, both morally and physically in
freedom” and “reconciles them with the interest of the senses”.290 The oppositions
between nature and reason are synthesized, and produce a “ new sensibility”; in the same
way that Schiller’s synthesis involves the unification of the sense-drive and the formdrive which produces a playful, aesthetic individual. But in order to achieve these radical
social conditions, as Marcuse says, we must redefine our understanding of true human
needs, which includes the reconfiguration of the social institutions that impose a one
dimensional way of life i.e. economic, political, etc.
Furthermore, the kind of subjectivity Marcuse proposes seeks to extend itself and
understand its world, by forming peaceful relationships with its environment instead of
289 Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Beacon Press: Boston Massachusetts, 1969, p.24
290 Marcuse, Herbert. Towards a Critical Theory o f Society. Douglas Kellner Ed. Vol. 2 o f Collected
Papers o f Herbert Marcuse. London: Routledge, 20 0 1 , p.87-88 “The resultant conception o f an
aestheticized and eroticized subjectivity preserves the connotation o f Sinnlichkeit as pertaining to
sensuality, receptiveness, art, and Eros, thus redeeming the body and the senses against the tyranny o f
repressive reason and affirming the importance o f aesthetics, play, and erotic activity in human life”,
This quote by Kellner serves to provide a link back to chapter two and what has been discussed about the
relationship between Eros and sensuousness.
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seeking to dominate it. For example, this eroticized subjectivity seeks “greater unities of
life”, and a more comprehensive concept of gratification that does not include the
consumption o f false needs.291

Thus, the eroticized subjectivity seeks to form a

completely new reality principle, that takes the demands of Eros more seriously.
Now the next step is to discuss the relationship between Marcuse’s “eroticized
subjectivity” and aesthetics. He will argue that aesthetics is the tool that we may use to
develop the demands o f Eros, and project better qualities o f human life. The critical,
negative powers of the aesthetic, which are present in the aesthetic form, allow us to
transcend the established order. I will now discuss this in more detail. Finally, I will
finish by linking Marcuse back with Schiller, through the point that the aesthetic realm is
an ideal which will allow us to gain deeper insights into qualitatively different forms of
human life.

THE RADICAL CHARACTER OF AESTHETICS:

In The Aesthetic Dimension Marcuse argues against a Marxist theory of
aesthetics, which ascribes a political function and a political dimension to art, and claims
that works of art reflect the particular interests of a specific social class. However, he
argues, the political dimension of art lies in the aesthetic form. As such, there is no need
to ‘inject’ aesthetics with political theory, he says:
But in contrast to orthodox Marxist aesthetics I see the political
potential of art in art itself, in the aesthetic form as such.
291 Further, Kellner explains Marcuse’s concept o f “Libidinal Rationality”, in which reason does not act as
an instrument o f domination over our inner and outer nature. Libidinal reason seeks to transform and shape
the world so as to meet the needs o f Eros the life instinct.

120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Furthermore, I argue that by virtue of its aesthetic form, art is
largely autonomous vis a vis the given social relations. In its
autonomy art both protests these relations, and at the same time
transcends them. Thereby art subverts the dominant
consciousness, the ordinary experience.292
At this point, I am not interested in pursuing Marcuse’s objections to the Marxist theory
of aesthetics; rather I intend to focus on his discussion of the “political potential of art”,
and “aesthetic form”, in order to make the link back to Schiller. Therefore, I will only
discuss the key points that Marcuse uses to differentiate his understanding of the political,
and ideological potential o f art versus that of Marxist aesthetic theory, as well as the
relevance o f aesthetic form.
First, Marcuse considers art to be revolutionary in both a narrow and a wide sense.
Revolutionary art in the narrow sense means that art is revolutionary “if it represents a
radical change in style and technique.”

However, Marcuse reminds us, this is only a

technical definition, and only one example of what revolutionary art seems to be, and as
such it tells us nothing about the authenticity and truth of the work. Therefore we must
understand art in the wider sense of the term. However, we should keep in mind, as I
mentioned at the end of Chapter Three, commodified art does not hold any revolutionary
potential for Marcuse. We must look to un-commodified art in order to gain an
appreciation for its liberating qualities.
Revolutionary art in the wide sense represents “the prevailing unfreedom and the
rebelling forces, thus breaking through the mystified (and petrified) social reality, and

292 Marcuse, Herbert. The Aeshtetic Dimension. Toward a Critique o f Marxist Aesthetics. Beacon Press:
Boston Massachusetts, 1978, p.ix.
293Ibid, p. x-xi For example, surrealist art anticipates considerable social changes such as the destructive
tendencies o f monopoly capitalism
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opening the horizon of change (liberation).”294 Specifically, “Revolutionary” in this
sense, refers to art that is “subversive of perception and understanding, an indictment of
the established reality, the appearance of the image of liberation.”295 We must This
means that a work o f art basically negates the established reality by projecting a
qualitatively different reality.
Though Marcuse acknowledges that different periods in human history and
different social classes express the subversive potential differently (which means that the
work does reflect the interests and values of different time periods and different social
classes), he also argues that “they are the specific historical expressions and
manifestations o f the same transhistorical substance of art: its own dimension of truth,
protest and promise, a dimension constituted by the aesthetic form.”296 Aesthetic form, as
Schiller discussed it, is the combination of form and matter according to the creative laws
of human imagination. The revolutionary potential of art lies in the work of art itself “as
7Q7

content having become form.”

Those last words are precisely the key back to

Schiller’s claim that form and content are synthesized through the aesthetic. A work of
art, therefore, represents the act of combining form and matter creatively and
imaginatively, that has, as a result, a negating effect on the established reality.298
What sets Marcuse’s view apart from the Marxist theory of aesthetics?

For

starters, he believes, the radical dimension of art is undermined when the work is

295 Ibid, recall this discussion in chapter 3, the critical capacities o f art which allow us to negate the
established conditions, and project better ones.
296 Ibid, xii
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
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blatantly political. To explain this in more detail Marcuse considers different parts of the
Marxist view o f art.299
1-The connection between art and the relations of production: as the modes of production
change art as well is transformed as part of the superstructure. As an ideology, art can
either lag behind or anticipate social change.
2-The connection between art and social class: Marxist aesthetics considers works of art
to be true, authentic and revolutionary if it expresses the consciousness of an ascending
social class.
3-As such, since art represents the consciousness of an ascending social class, both the
political and the aesthetic coincide.
4-It is the duty o f the artist to express the values and interests of the ascending class (in
capitalism, it would be the proletariat)
5-The declining class and its representatives only produce “decadent” art.
6-Realism is considered to be art work that best corresponds to given social relationships,
and thus considered to be a “correct” form of art.300
The common line running through all these points is that the social relations of
production must be represented in the work of art “not imposed upon the work externally,
but a part of its inner logic and the logic of the material”.
As such, the realm of the aesthetic is compromised. Marxist aesthetics reduces the
political potential of art to ideology “a normative notion of the material base as the true
reality and a political devaluation of nonmaterial forces particularly of the individual
consciousness and subconscious and their political function.”

The political function of

art maybe emancipatory or regressive, but it both cases it becomes a material force,

299 Again, my aim is not to discuss the internal problems with Marxist aesthetic theory, but simply to
highlight some o f the features in order to contrast them with Marcuse’s view o f aesthetics. I will leave it up
to the reader’s interest to investigate the relationship between Marcuse and Marxist aesthetics.
300 Ibid, p.2
301 Ibid.
302 Ibid, p.3
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leaving no room for ideology.303 This is a problem for Marcuse who identifies with
Schiller’s view that aesthetics is first and foremost and ideal that may be concretized
through human action, but is not reduced to it.
This is precisely the point behind the ideology of the aesthetic: the realm of
aesthetic form represents an ideal towards which we should aim. The transcendental
powers of art, its liberating qualities and its ability to reject the status quo, lie in its ability
to project possibilities that are antagonistic to the established reality principle. Art moves
beyond the established reality by expressing the negation of that reality.304 As such, Art
creates and expresses the true reality that is suppressed by the established reality.
Therefore, a work of art breaks down the established understanding of love, happiness,
death and sorrow, and expresses the repressed reality of such concepts.
Marcuse says:
Under the law of the aesthetic form, the given reality is
necessarily sublimated: the immediate content is stylized, the
“data” are reshaped and reordered in accordance with the
demands o f the art form, which requires that even the
representation o f death and destruction invoke the need for
hope— a need rooted in the new consciousness embodied in the
work o f art.306
Aesthetic form basically transforms the given reality according to the wishes of the
pleasure principle. However, we must keep in mind that human reality does not simply
transform on its own, it requires the reorganization of the social conditions that harm it.
303 Marcuse stresses that historical materialism must account for the role o f subjectivity, and the non
material in aesthetics.
304 For example, if the established reality principle favors quiet music, made with specialized instruments
such as: horns, violins, cellos etc. radical art may respond by creating music with the use o f trash cans,
broom sticks and wooden boards (such as the loud percussive music o f the ever popular group “Stomp”).
305 Ibid, p.7 recall the discussion, in the previous chapter, about the critical powers o f the aesthetic.
306 Ibid.
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And we may tie this back the discussion o f Eros in Chapter Two: Individuals may think

and act on the basis o f the pleasure principle to reorder the established reality principle.
As such, the demands of the life instincts will ultimately shine through the aesthetic form,
so that even images of death and destruction “invoke the need for hope.”
“Aesthetic form” is the key term that links Marcuse back to Schiller. We may
recall from chapter one that, for Schiller, aesthetic form results in the creation of a work
of art through the imaginative manipulation of form and content. Likewise, for Marcuse,
aesthetic form represents the negation of the given reality through a work of art. Morton
Schoolman explains
First, by virtue o f aesthetic form, art possesses a remote eccentric
language that contrasts sharply with ordinary discourse. Through
art, particular human experiences are removed from their
historical and social context and are universalized as a realm of
potential experience for all mankind. In other words, particular
experiences are given a new form as universal human
potentialities.307
Furthermore, aesthetic form is the shape of the reality that is transformed through art. The
way in which this transformation takes place, Marcuse tells us, seems to be through the
manipulation o f form and content i.e. “language, perception, and understanding.” By
manipulating form and content, the artist may then re-present the established reality as the
illusion, and “the repressed potentialities of man and nature.” As such, the artist is also
able to negate that illusion and project possibilities of a more truthful reality.308

307 Schoolman, Morton. The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory o f Herbert Marcuse. The Free Press, a
division o f Collier Macmillan Co., Inc. N ew York, 1980, p.330
308 Ibid, p.8 Marcuse emphasizes, the critical, negating function o f art does not depend on how well its
content mimics the established reality. Rather, the emancipatory potential o f art lies in the content having
form, which means: the artist takes the content from the established reality (such as for example, a guitar,
percussions etc.) and gives it form by manipulating it according to imagination, and not according to fact.
“The critical function o f art, its contribution to the struggle for liberation, resides in the aesthetic form. A
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CONCLUSION;
Thus far, Marcuse explains the political and ideological function of art: to reshape
the world so that the perception of individuals is ‘shaken’ from its established principles.
Those established principles that motivated individuals to be productive members of
society are the same principles that keep them trapped in a vicious cycle of oppression
and servitude. Marcuse continues, to be able to see the reality that is communicated by art
individuals must possess a certain degree of freedom from the established reality
principle. Furthermore, he reiterates what he has argued in One-Dimensional Man that he
is presupposing the existence of a rational, autonomous Individual. Since the world of art
is a completely different reality, what Marcuse is saying seems to be that we need a
different kind of perception to be able to understand the principles of a completely
different reality.
In order to foster this new form of perception we must address the social and
political conditions that undermine its growth, e.g. the unequal distribution of wealth,
privatized business sectors and institutions, unemployment etc. Tying this point back to
Chapter Three, a one-dimensional frame of mind, which only considers what is imposed
on it from without, cannot consider the radical potential of aesthetics: because the
established social order has no room for aesthetics as such. But as long as individuals do
not possess the necessary resources to even be in a position of developing their aesthetic
talents, aesthetics on its own, no matter how virtuous it may be, cannot lead to change.
However, Marcuse wants to end on a positive note that is meant to be every bit as
idealistic as Schiller’s view. Both authors acknowledge that it is only when we have
work o f art is authentic or true not by virtue o f its content (i.e., the “correct” representation o f social
conditions), nor by its “pure” form, but by the content having become form.”
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properly arranged the social and political conditions of society that we may benefit from
the healing powers of aesthetics. But the problem is exactly this: that not many people
have access to the means for an aesthetic education, because they are trapped within the
cycle of labor and consumption. For this reason we must address the issue of human
needs, which itself requires a reconfiguration of the social institutions in capitalism.
The overall goal o f this project has been to critically examine the social and
political conditions that stifle the overall growth of human beings. Individuals gain the
most benefit from society, ideally, when social institutions serve the interests of the
public. Human life, indeed all life, comes in second as more and more private institutions
seek economic growth over and above true human needs. The aesthetic realm allows us to
project better possibilities for human life, and truly experience the depth of human
potential, and in this sense it is possesses both functional and intrinsic value. In a society
where social institutions are organized so as to meet humanity’s true needs individuals are
able to develop every one of their faculties, thus becoming “complete individuals.” I will
end with a passage by Marcuse that I believe captures the ideal of a unified human
existence under the guidance of the aesthetic realm:
the aesthetic dimension can serve as a sort of gauge for a free
society. A universe of human relationships no longer mediated by
the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation or terror,
demands a sensitivity freed from the repressive satisfactions of the
unfree societies; a sensitivity receptive to forms and modes of
reality which thus far have been projected only by the aesthetic
imagination. For the aesthetic needs have their own social
content: they are the claims of the human organism, mind and
body, for a dimension of fulfillment which can be created only in
the struggle against the institutions which, by their very
functioning, deny and violate these claims.309

309

Ibid, p.28
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